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A theory of why Ethereum is perhaps better "sound money" than Bitcoin.

The idea of Bitcoin's supremacy as "sound money" is very frequently thrown around by the biggest talking heads in the crypto world. I know I will get a lot of hate for suggesting that this theory is not only flawed, but it is straight up wrong. As unintuitive as it may sound to Bitcoin maximalists (no offense intended) I believe Ethereum is on the path to becoming the global leading asset and model for sound money... give me a chance to explain why.

  1. The idea that nothing can change Bitcoin's issuance schedule is a myth. There is absolutely no divine power controlling the supply of Bitcoin. Contrary to what is commonly asserted, Bitcoin's issuance protocol is not primarily driven by what is currently implemented. The real driver is consensus: the majority of network participants must agree that what is currently defined cannot be changed. There is an underlying assumption that the consensus would never want to change Bitcoin's issuance. On the surface this makes for a nice "sound money" narrative, but it is false premise and sticking to it could be ultimately detrimental. It presents a long term sustainability issue (the hope that somehow Bitcoin's base layer will scale enough to maintain security entirely through fees). It also completely dismisses the possibility that an unforeseen event could create pressure to change the issuance. If Bitcoin managed to create a consensus mechanism that did not rely on mining, it is very likely there would be consensus to reduce issuance. On the other hand, if some potentially catastrophic event would create incentives to increase the issuance, it would only make sense for the network to do so.
  2. Issuance flexibility is not fundamentally bad. Etheruem's approach to adjust the issuance according to the contextual circumstances has resulted in a faster rate of issuance reduction than what was originally defined in the protocol. The rate of issuance will continue to decrease as new developments allow for it to happen without compromising the network security. There is a very high probability that Ethereum will achieve a lower issuance rate than Bitcoin in the next two years, and it could possibly achieve zero issuance in the next five years. This would be a result of a successful implementation of PoS, sharding and EIP-1559.
  3. The root of all evil is Proof of Work. PoW is by far the primary cost of operating the Bitcoin network. It is the primary determinant of how much issuance is needed as a financial incentive to keep miners doing their thing. The very mechanism that secures the network's decentralization is unfortunately quite wasteful. The degree of decentralization is a direct result of how much random mathematical operations are being done by miners.
  4. There is a better way. Some people will take offense by the use of the word wasteful, and they claim that it is not because those mindless calculations are what is actually securing the network. However, its wasteful aspect becomes clear if there is a different way to achieve equal or superior decentralization without the need to crunch difficult computational problems. This just so happens to be embodied in Ethereum's design of Proof of Stake. It will drastically reduce the cost of securing the network, while providing at least 2-3% annual returns for the ownership of Ether. When Ethereum's issuance becomes lower than its staking rewards, it will effectively have achieved the same effect as having zero (or possibly negative) issuance.
  5. The value proposition of Ethereum 2.0 is unmatched. There is just absolutely no asset in the world that has a 2-3% self-denominated annual returns and just so happens to be rapidly appreciating. When wall-street's greed sees this, it will create the mother of all bubbles.
  6. Don't dismiss the flippening. On February 01 2018 Ethereum reached 70% of Bitcoin's marked cap (it was even closer if you account for the amount of lost bitcoins). That happened before DEFI, before proof of staking was within reach, before multiple effective layer 2 solutions were a thing, before wrapped Bitcoins and before the first signs of mass adoption were on the horizon (like integration with Reddit , VISA and potential to compete with SWIFT). Utility is a huge factor in driving prices, lets not forget how Silk Road played a key role into propelling Bitcoin's value. Yes, Ethereum crashed hard after the peak in 2018, but perhaps it is simply manifesting a higher volatility pattern that is reminiscent of Bitcoin's early years. Bitcoin's first 5 years were characterized by aggressive price swings, why should it be different for Etheruem (considering it is about 5 years younger than Bitcoin)? If the volatility patterns stands on this bull market, we will see a flippening.
So... do I think Etheruem will flip? Yes I do, but I still hold Bitcoin. No one has a crystal ball, and nothing is certain. Perhaps Etheruem will crash and burn, perhaps Bitcoin will become the next Yahoo, and perhaps they will both thrive in this new exciting crypto world.
submitted by TheWierdGuy to ethereum [link] [comments]

Cyptocurrency pegged to electricity price

Meter.io aims to create a low volatile currency following 10 kwh electricity price.
Meter uses a hybrid PoW/PoS solution; PoW mining for stable coin creation and PoS for txn ordering
  1. MTR is stablecoin soft pegged around the global competitive price of 10 kwh electricity
  2. MTRG is the finite supply governance token, which is used by PoS validators to validate transactions.
Pow mining in Meter is as open and decentralized as in Bitcoin but differs from that in Bitcoin in two fundamental ways
  1. Block rewards are dynamic. It’s determined as a function of pow difficulty. The wining Meter miner will earn more MTR if hash rate is high and less MTR if hash rate is low, ensuring a stable cost of production for each MTR at 10 kWh electricity price using mainstream mining equipment
  2. Miner’s don’t validate transactions. They simply compete to solve PoW. Txn ordering is done by PoS validators who secure the network and in return earn txn fees.
All stablecoins must essentialy have stability mechanisms to account for cases where demand is high and where demand is low. MTR has 2 stability mechanisms set to solve this mission.
Supply side stability mechanism (long term)
First and foremost MTR can’t be produced out of thin air. It’s issuance follows a disciplined monetary policy that solely depends on profit seeking behavior of miners. The only way to issue MTR is via PoW mining. When miners notice that price of MTR is getting higher than the cost to produce them (remember cost of production is always fixed at 10 kwh elec. price = around 0.9-1.2 usd) they will turn on their equipment and start creating new supply. If demand keeps increasing more miners will join, and more MTR will be printed to keep up with demand. Eventually supply will outperfrom the demand and price will get back to equilibrium.
When demand is low and MTR price is dropping below 10 kwh elec. price miners will not risk their profit margin to shrink and switch to mine other coins instead of MTR. In return MTR production will stop and no additional MTR will enter circulation. Given that mining is a competitive, open enviroment, price of MTR will eventually equal to the cost to produce it. (Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost).
The long term stability is achieved through this unique and simple mechanism at layer 1 which doesn’t require use of capital inefficient collateral, complicated oracles, seignorage shares or algorithmic rebasing mechanisms.
Relative to nation based fiat currencies, switching cost between crytocurrencies is significantly lower. Sudden demand changes in crypto is therefore very common and must be addressed. Huge drop in demand may temporarly cause MTR to get traded below it’s cost of production making pow mining a losing game. How can the system recover from that and restart production? On the contrary, a sudden increase in demand may cause MTR to get traded at a premium making mining temporarly very profitable. Meter has a second layer stability mechanism in order to absorb sudden demand changes.
Demand side stability mechanism (short term)
An on chain auction (will become live in October 2020) resets every 24 hours offering newly minted fixed number of MTRGs in exchange for bids in MTR. Participants bid at no specific price and at the end of auction recieve MTRG proportional to their percentage of total bid. The main purpose of this auction is to consume MTR. A portion of MTR (initally %60) that is bidded in the auction ends up going to a reserve that is collectively owned by MTRG holders, essentially getting out of circulation. Future use of MTR in Reserve can be decided by governance. The remaining %40 gets gradually distributed to PoS validators as block rewards. This reserve allocation ratio can be adjusted via governance depending on the amount of MTR needed to be removed out of circulation at any point in time.
Meter team working to make Meter compatible with other blockchain. In fact both MTR and MTRG can currently be 1:1 bridged to their Ethereum versions as eMTR and eMTRG respectively. In near term, stablecoin MTR is set out on a mission to serve as collateral and a crypto native unit of account for DeFi.
submitted by cangurel to CryptoMoonShots [link] [comments]

A theory of why Ethereum is perhaps better "sound money" than Bitcoin.

The idea of Bitcoin's supremacy as "sound money" is very frequently thrown around by the biggest talking heads in the crypto world. I know I will get a lot of hate for suggesting that this theory is not only flawed, but it is straight up wrong. As unintuitive as it may sound to Bitcoin maximalists (no offense intended) I believe Ethereum is on the path to becoming the global leading asset and model for sound money... give me a chance to explain why.
  1. The idea that nothing can change Bitcoin's issuance schedule is a myth. There is absolutely no divine power controlling the supply of Bitcoin. Contrary to what is commonly asserted, Bitcoin's issuance protocol is not primarily driven by what is currently implemented. The real driver is consensus: the majority of network participants must agree that what is currently defined cannot be changed. There is an underlying assumption that the consensus would never want to change Bitcoin's issuance. On the surface this makes for a nice "sound money" narrative, but it is false premise and sticking to it could be ultimately detrimental. It presents a long term sustainability issue (the hope that somehow Bitcoin's base layer will scale enough to maintain security entirely through fees). It also completely dismisses the possibility that an unforeseen event could create pressure to change the issuance. If Bitcoin managed to create a consensus mechanism that did not rely on mining, it is very likely there would be consensus to reduce issuance. On the other hand, if some potentially catastrophic event would create incentives to increase the issuance, it would only make sense for the network to do so.
  2. Issuance flexibility is not fundamentally bad. Etheruem's approach to adjust the issuance according to the contextual circumstances has resulted in a faster rate of issuance reduction than what was originally defined in the protocol. The rate of issuance will continue to decrease as new developments allow for it to happen without compromising the network security. There is a very high probability that Ethereum will achieve a lower issuance rate than Bitcoin in the next two years, and it could possibly achieve zero issuance in the next five years. This would be a result of a successful implementation of PoS, sharding and EIP-1559.
  3. The root of all evil is Proof of Work. PoW is by far the primary cost of operating the Bitcoin network. It is the primary determinant of how much issuance is needed as a financial incentive to keep miners doing their thing. The very mechanism that secures the network's decentralization is unfortunately quite wasteful. The degree of decentralization is a direct result of how much random mathematical operations are being done by miners.
  4. There is a better way. Some people will take offense by the use of the word wasteful, and they claim that it is not because those mindless calculations are what is actually securing the network. However, its wasteful aspect becomes clear if there is a different way to achieve equal or superior decentralization without the need to crunch mathematical problems. This just so happens to be embodied in Ethereum's design of Proof of Stake. It will drastically reduce the cost of securing the network, while providing at least 2-3% annual returns for the ownership of Ether. When Ethereum's issuance becomes lower than its staking rewards, it will effectively have achieved the same effect as having zero (or possibly negative) issuance.
  5. The value proposition of Ethereum 2.0 is unmatched. There is just absolutely no asset in the world that has a 2-3% self-denominated annual returns and just so happens to be rapidly appreciating. When wall-street's greed sees this, it will create the mother of all bubbles.
  6. Don't dismiss the flippening. On February 01 2018 Ethereum reached 70% of Bitcoin's marked cap (it was even closer if you account for the amount of lost bitcoins). That happened before DEFI, before proof of staking was within reach, before multiple effective layer 2 solutions were a thing, before wrapped Bitcoins and before the first signs of mass adoption were on the horizon (like integration with Reddit , VISA and potential to compete with SWIFT). Utility is a huge factor in driving prices, lets not forget how Silk Road played a key role into propelling Bitcoin's value. Yes, Ethereum crashed hard after the peak in 2018, but perhaps it is simply manifesting a higher volatility pattern that is reminiscent of Bitcoin's early years. Bitcoin's first 5 years were characterized by aggressive price swings, why should it be different for Etheruem (considering it is about 5 years younger than Bitcoin)? If the volatility patterns stands on this bull market, we will see a flippening.
So... do I think Etheruem will flip? Yes I do, but I still hold Bitcoin. No one has a crystal ball, and nothing is certain. Perhaps Etheruem will crash and burn, perhaps Bitcoin will become the next Yahoo, and perhaps they will both thrive in this new exciting crypto world.
submitted by TheWierdGuy to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Staking in Compendia and how its approach differs from other (D)PoS networks

In this article, we'll be discussing staking and how it works in Compendia.
There are several misconceptions out there that arise due to the way staking is utilized across different networks. Compendia use a novel way of staking, by combining the way it locks funds to earn more coins in recent proof-of-stake (PoS) networks - with the aspect of vote power traditionally seen in delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) networks.
Staking in (D)PoS networks vs. Compendia
Staking (commonly misspelt as 'stacking' or 'steaking') is the process of leveraging an acquired amount of coins/tokens from a certain blockchain to contribute to the network, by holding them in an address and using an (either online or offline) wallet client to earn revenue based on the amount of coins/tokens held.
PoS (proof-of-stake) networks
In traditional proof-of-stake networks such as Stratis or Cardano requires users to purchase a certain amount of coins, place those in an online wallet and letting the wallet client emulate a certain amount of computing power - which is in turn used to mine/forge new blocks to the blockchain. In more recent proof-of-stake networks such as Cosmos, users are required to lock their funds in an address - with a cooldown period added when wanting to unlock those funds. This way, coins are taken out of circulation rather than just being held (but still immediately spendable) as with Stratis/Cardano. In both situations, anyone can contribute to the network by staking and the more coins staked, the higher likelihood of mining/forging a new block and earning the block reward. You can earn individually from staking, or join a pool.
DPoS (delegated proof-of-stake) networks
In delegated proof-of-stake networks, such as ARK or EOS, there are only a set number of nodes (known as validators, block producers or delegates) that are allowed to forge new blocks. In ARK, there are 51 forging delegates and we will use this amount as an example. Contributors have to gain votes from other network participants, who pledge their account balance as votes, and once they have a total amount of votes that put them into the top 51, they will be able to forge blocks and earn rewards. The account balance of participants who vote for a forging validator remain unlocked and therefore it is possible to immediately spend funds held in an address. The amount of votes per address varies across different DPoS networks, but the principle is the same: one coin means one vote power. You can only earn individually if you are one of the top validators; otherwise, you have to vote and receive a portion of rewards from a forging validator.
Compendia
In Compendia, the above two methods are combined into a new dynamic: staking your BIND locks up your funds for a set period (3 - 6 - 12 months) as in proof-of-stake networks, but it does NOT grant the ability to earn. You will still need to vote for a sharing validator, like in delegated proof-of-stake networks. What does staking do then, if it does not let you earn on its own?
Staking your BIND for a set period applies a multiple (5x - 7.5x - 10x) to the voting power of your staked balance. This means that one staked BIND is no longer counted as one vote, but as 5 votes (or 7.5 votes, or 10 votes - depending on the lock period). This way it increases your potential earnings when you vote for a sharing validator. So, by pledging to lock your funds for a certain amount of time and thereby decreasing the circulating amount of BIND, you will be able to earn more with the same amount of coins than if you would not stake, and only vote.
When staking, your BIND will go through 5 different phases:
Securing the Network
DPoS delegates/validators secure the blockchain through forging blocks, and in the case of Compendia, there are 47 validators (rather than the 51 in ARK) and each active validator forges one block every 6 seconds. Therefore 47 new blocks are forged every 4.7 minutes (6 * 47 = 282 seconds = 4.7 minutes). In a similar way to proof-of-work networks such as Bitcoin, a block contains transactions and the validator that forges them receives a proportion of the transaction fee (described in the Fee Removal Model further below).
Supply Inflation
DPoS chains typically have fixed inflation based over several years, this is to help control the coin supply in circulation. Inflation comes from Delegate/Validators forging new blocks as described above. The effect of validators forging new blocks increases the supply by either ß3.9 per block (if ranked 6th to 47th), or ß4.84 per block (if ranked 1st to 5th).
The Compendia blockchain produces around ß1,753,200 - Per month
Block rewards are controlled through an annual milestone which is fixed in the current networks config. This can only be updated if the 47 validators reach consensus and accept the potential change.
The milestones for BIND are as follows:
Years Rewards (6-47) Rewards (Top 5) Average
1-3 3.9 4.84 4
4-6 1.95 2.42 2
7-9 0.975 1.21 1
Deflationary Effects
In general DPoS blockchains allow voters to vote, allocating their wallet weight to a specific delegate/validator and receiving rewards commensurate to weight. This helps control inflation as the coins are out of supply when being used to vote, but the coins are not locked for a fixed time, a voter can move some or all funds at any time.
What differentiates Compendia?
The key difference is that staked coins are locked for a fixed period, either 3, 6, or 12 months (as described above). The coins are effectively locked out of supply, by incentivising voters to lock their coins for the maximum period of 12 months. This helps offset the increase in supply through forging rewards.
At the time of writing, ß11,816,021 is currently locked into staking, given the current BIND supply (i.e nOS to BIND) ß112,894,676, around 10% of all BIND in circulation is locked out of supply for the staking periods highlighted earlier. With the current staked coins, it would take just over 6 months for inflation to offset the monthly forging reward increase.
Fee removal model.
Compendia also offer another deflationary measure through a sophisticated fee removal model.
The Fee Collection and Removal Model works as follows:
- 100% of collected fees up to the amount equal to the block reward in a block are permanently removed from circulation.
- 50% of any remaining collected fees are also removed from circulation.
- The other 50% is awarded to the forging validator.
This fee system helps with combating possible shifts in Vote Power going from voters towards validators during times of increased transaction activity on the network.
Summary
The Compendia Team has a clear understanding of the tokenomics of a blockchain, lessons have been learned from earlier DPoS implementations and new strategies have been deployed to ensure a fairer, more balanced approach to DPoS tokenomics.
If you have enjoyed reading this blog please consider voting for validators BFX & Cryptomanic. Thank you
submitted by c_ryptomaniac to Compendia [link] [comments]

Why UMI is a Step toward a Free Financial World

Why UMI is a Step toward a Free Financial World

https://preview.redd.it/sk4qzvg2o5p51.jpg?width=1024&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=42c422967888ffb44288e1cf7b8e9b4ffd6e20a1
Quite recently, the world has seen a remarkable event — an anonymous bitcoin whale sent a total of $2.24 billion in a series of transactions. Large transactions are certainly not uncommon for the bitcoin network. Whale Alert — blockchain tracker and analytics system — regularly reports large and interesting transactions. Although $2.24 billion is the largest ever cryptocurrency transfer, the most remarkable thing about this event is not the transfer amount but the incredibly little fee the sender paid for the transaction — less than $1. With no checkups and intermediaries.
If such a transfer had happened a few years ago, it would have considered abnormal and unreal. Today it is a matter of fact. With each passing day, using cryptocurrency for making transfers is getting more attractive than bank transfers. The UMI network, which enables instant payments with no fees, fits in best with new realities. Let's explore this issue.
Freedom from Bank Charges
The BTC whale sent the above-mentioned amount in seven successive transactions within one hour. The total amount was 241,500 BTC, which was equivalent to $2.24 bln. Each transfer cost around 0.0001 BTC or just $0.93, giving a total of about $6.51 for the seven transfers.
Let's compare now how much you would be charged for an identical transfer in a bank.
In big banks, the international transfer fee is at least 1% of the amount, but it is often higher than that depending on the conditions. For instance, the VISA system charges 1 to 10% of the transaction amount for an international transfer (minimum of $10). Therefore, the more you transfer, the more you pay for it. To transfer the above-mentioned amount via a bank, a customer would have to part with as much as $22.4 mln (!!!), in the best-case scenario — that is if the fee is the minimum 1%. In other words, a bank would make a fortune — virtually at the drop of a hat, making no effort whatsoever — by simply taking someone's money. What makes it more absurd is that banks intend to further raise their fees amid coronavirus pandemic.
Cryptocurrencies are a completely different story. In most cryptocurrency networks, fees do not depend on the transaction amount — the same fee could be charged for transferring $1 or $1 bln. In the cryptocurrency world, it doesn't matter how much money you transfer. If you make a big transfer, no one makes you pay the “tithe”. With UMI, you don't have to pay anything to anyone — not a dime. But we'll get back to this a little later.
Freedom from Excessive Limits and Unneeded Checkups
First, let's consider another important factor — the very possibility to make unhindered transfers of large amounts via bank especially foreign transfers. The irony is that even if someone chooses to pay this multi-million dollar fee, the transfer would far from being 100% successful.
In most countries, including the Russian Federation, a $22 bln transaction would be virtually impossible to run in a state-owned bank, let alone private banks. Even going through a bunch of mandatory procedures as well as wasting lots of nerves and time wouldn't save the day. This is why a payment of this size is virtually impossible:
  1. The overwhelming majority of the world's banks just don't happen to have such large amounts on their correspondent accounts. Even if we assume they do have sufficient funds on the books, this money doesn't just sit idle — bankers use it in their own favor, for instance, to grant loans, make deposit payments, etc. No bank would agree to send all its reserve funds to another bank on your orders. Moreover, banks have no right to violate the law in terms of reserve requirements, including currency norms. And processing such a large amount contradicts the established rules and regulations. So, even if money is technically recorded on the customer's account, transferring it to another bank, especially in a foreign country, is still a virtually impossible task.
  2. In almost all states transactions of this scale are only allowed on the level of governments, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or mega-tycoons with a declared multi-billion dollar income, such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and the like. In other words, only customers with a special status can make especially large transfers without restrictions. Any “abnormal” transactions fall under suspicion and automatically frozen. If you have always run $500 transactions on a monthly basis, any incoming or outgoing $10,000 transfer would most probably be frozen. Let alone billions of dollars. An average owner of a large business will only be allowed to transfer billions of dollars after they get approval from FATF on an individual basis. Obviously, they must also be verified using KYC (Know Your Customer) and AML (Anti-money laundering) procedures and must establish the provenance of each dime they transfer. They have to do all this to transfer THEIR money, with a huge fee of billions of dollars.
  3. The situation is even worse because it is equally true for receiving monetary transfers. In other words, if you have a large amount successfully transferred to you, there is no guarantee that you can use this money. Sadly, even if the money leaves the sender's bank, the recipient's bank can instantly freeze it. On the very same day, you could get a visit from bank or government officials along with the state security service and a special interrogation. If you cannot provide provenance data for the funds, the transfer could easily remain frozen for good. Naturally, this system opens the doors for various types of abuse of power and manipulation by bankers, governments, and state services.
For the existing banking system, any big transaction makes you a suspect of some manipulations resulting in a frozen transfer. More importantly, it isn't only true for multi-billion or multi-million transfers. Any transaction involving hundreds of thousands, dozens of thousands, or simply thousands of dollars may be deemed suspicious and sanctioned. It means that anyone who runs relatively big transactions runs the risk of encountering certain problems at any time.
Cryptocurrencies are a step toward free transfers
The above-described situation proves that digital money helps people get rid of many problems related to bank transfers: high fees, payment amount limits, specification of personal data, verification procedures. With digital money, you don't have to prove or explain anything. This is a real revolution that makes people free from fees and manipulation. Cryptocurrencies allow people to be a master of their funds and no one has the power to change this. No one charges you crazy fees and no one can steal your coins.
With each passing minute, cryptocurrencies are becoming part of our life, and rather than profit from trading, investment, mining, or staking, they are regarded as a convenient way of sending funds. Only cryptocurrencies make people feel completely safe and allow them to transfer whatever amount wherever they want. This is a huge step towards changing the existing financial system, and it has already been made.
But UMI Goes Even Further
It may appear that problem with bank fees concerns only large businessmen. In real fact, regular people living live paycheck to paycheck are more sensitive to this issue. Being on a tight budget, most people have to pay for any bank transaction.
You always pay fees charged by banks — when you pay utility bills, buy online, deposit money to your bank card, receive money, transfer money between your accounts or withdraw cash from an ATM. Overall, bank fees cost people a lot of money. It's curious to know how much your pay banks every year for mediation.
Now let's see how you can make transactions using UMI.
In terms of fees, UMI is more profitable than banks and even more profitable than most of the other cryptocurrencies, including bitcoin. There are no fees in the UMI network at all, even hidden ones. All transactions are instant. That is, if you sent $2.24 billion through the UMI network, it would be instant and completely free. There are no limits, verifications, and other nervous procedures. Instant, free, and secure — here and now.
This is the key advantage of UMI as a payment instrument. Our cryptocurrency empowers all people — from large businessmen to factory workers — with profitable and absolutely safe funds transfers. UMI gives all people around the globe equal opportunities. This is the next step toward a free financial world. We are the first to make it.
Sincerely yours, UMI team
submitted by UMITop to u/UMITop [link] [comments]

Help me understand something about bitcoin

I've been thinking about this for a while now.
Price is created by supply and demand... Someone has to sell, and there needs to be buyers. More buyers than sellers equal greater demand therefore increase in price... I understand this.
Currently there is talk that the number of hodlers are increasing.... So that means less and less bitcoin is being traded... Also I understand that miners are bringing btc to market to sell to cover costs, but due to halving this amount decreases every 210,000 blocks/approximately 4 years.
So in theory, as more holders come to btc...less btc comes to market... Price goes up.
Here's what I need to understand... As holders keep holding, and buying dips....they currently are subject to the traders...
Even if 20.5 million btc are mined... And 20 million btc are held.... It is that .5 million that is being traded, that controls the price...
So as more and more btc is taken out of circulation, less and less is being traded....
It is this small amount traded controlling price...
Let's say btc stays at a range of $8500- 12k for 10 years.... This is possible if people slowly take btc off the market... Which is probably happening now.
Unless huge amounts of people flock to btc in a short amount of time, and all the available btc brought to market sells ASAP.... There is no way we can reach highs of $100,000.
If we continue at our current pace of growth...spread over years... It is most probable that for the next few years, possibly until next halving, we may stay in a range of 4k- 14k...
Please school me.
submitted by jgarcya to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

A theory of why Ethereum is perhaps better "sound money" than Bitcoin.

The idea that Bitcoin's supremacy as "sound money" is very frequently thrown around by the biggest talking heads in the crypto world. I know I will get a lot of hate for suggesting that this theory is not only flawed, but it is straight up wrong. As unintuitive as it may sound to Bitcoin maximalists (no offense intended) I believe Ethereum is on the path to becoming the global leading asset and model for sound money... give me a chance to explain why.
  1. The idea that nothing can change Bitcoin's issuance schedule is a myth. There is absolutely no divine power controlling the supply of Bitcoin. Contrary to what is commonly asserted, Bitcoin's issuance protocol is not primarily driven by what is currently implemented. The real driver is consensus: the majority of network participants must agree that what is currently defined must not be changed. There is an underlying assumption that the consensus would never want to change Bitcoin's issuance. On the surface this makes for a nice "sound money" narrative, but it is false premise and sticking to it could be ultimately detrimental. It presents a long term sustainability issue (the hope that somehow Bitcoin's base layer will scale enough to maintain security entirely through fees). It also completely dismisses the possibility that an unforeseen event could create pressure to change the issuance. If Bitcoin managed to create a consensus mechanism that did not rely on mining, it it very likely there would be consensus to reduce issuance. On the other hand, if some potentially catastrophic event would create incentives to increase the issuance, it would only make sense for the network to do so.
  2. Issuance flexibility is not fundamentally bad. Etheruem's approach to adjust the issuance according to the contextual circumstances has resulted in a faster rate of issuance reduction than what was originally defined in the protocol. The rate of issuance will continue to decrease as new developments allow for it to happen without compromising the network security. There is a very high probability that Ethereum will achieve a lower issuance rate than Bitcoin in the next two years, and it could possibly achieve zero issuance in the next five years. This would be a result of a successful implementation of PoS, shading and EIP-1559.
  3. The root of all evil is Proof of Work. PoW is by far the primary cost of operating the Bitcoin network. It is the primary determinant of how much issuance is needed as a financial incentive to keep miners doing their thing. The very mechanism that secures the network's decentralization is unfortunately quite wasteful. The degree of decentralization is a direct result of how much random mathematical operations are being done by miners.
  4. There is a better way. Some people will take offense by the use of the word wasteful, and they claim that it is not because those mindless calculations are what is actually securing the network. However, its wasteful aspect becomes clear if there is a different way to achieve equal or superior decentralization without the need to crunch mathematical problems. This just so happens to be embodied in Ethereum's design of Proof of Stake. It will drastically reduce the cost of securing the network, while providing at least 2-3% annual returns for the ownership of Ether. When Ethereum's issuance becomes lower than its staking rewards, it will effectively have achieved the same effect as having zero (or possibly negative) issuance.
  5. The value proposition of Etheruem 2.0 is unmatched. There is just absolutely no asset in the world that has a 2-3% self-denominated annual returns and just so happens to be rapidly appreciating. When wall-street's greed sees this, it will create the mother of all bubbles.
  6. Don't dismiss the flippening. On February 01 2018 Ethereum reached 70% of Bitcoin's marked cap. That happened before DEFI, before proof of staking was within reach, before effectrive layer 2 was a thing, before wrapped Bitcoins and before the first signs of mass adoption use cases were actually on the table (like integration with Reddit, VISA). Utility is a huge factor in driving prices, lets not forget how Silk Road played a key role into propelling Bitcoin's value. Yes, Etheruem crashed hard after the peak in 2018, but perhaps it is simply manifesting a higher volatility pattern that is reminiscent of Bitcoin's early years. Bitcoin's first 5 years were characterized by aggressive price swings, why should it be different for Etheruem (considering it is about 5 years younger than Bitcoin)? If the volatility patterns stands on this bull market, we will see a flippening.
So... do I think Etheruem will flip? Yes I do, but I still hold Bitcoin. No one has crystal ball, and nothing is certain. Perhaps Etheruem will crash and burn, perhaps Bitcoin will become the next Yahoo, and perhaps they will both thrive in this new exciting crypto world.
submitted by TheWierdGuy to ethtrader [link] [comments]

[OWL WATCH] Waiting for "IOTA TIME" 20; Hans's re-defined directions for DLT

Disclaimer: This is my editing, so there could be some misunderstandings...
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wellwho오늘 오후 4:50
u/Ben Royce****how far is society2 from having something clickable powered by IOTA?
Ben Royce오늘 오후 4:51
demo of basic tech late sep/ early oct. MVP early 2021
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HusQy
Colored coins are the most misunderstood upcoming feature of the IOTA protocol. A lot of people see them just as a competitor to ERC-20 tokens on ETH and therefore a way of tokenizing things on IOTA, but they are much more important because they enable "consensus on data".
Bob
All this stuff already works on neblio but decentralized and scaling to 3500 tps
HusQy
Neblio has 8 mb blocks with 30 seconds blocktime. This is a throughput of 8 mb / 30 seconds = 267 kb per second. Transactions are 401+ bytes which means that throughput is 267 kb / 401 bytes = 665 TPS. IOTA is faster, feeless and will get even faster with the next update ...
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HusQy
Which DLT would be more secure? One that is collaboratively validated by the economic actors of the world (coporations, companies, foundations, states, people) or one that is validated by an anonymous group of wealthy crypto holders?
HusQy
The problem with current DLTs is that we use protection mechanisms like Proof of Work and Proof of Stake that are inherently hard to shard. The more shards you have, the more you have to distribute your hashing power and your stake and the less secure the system becomes.
HusQy
Real world identities (i.e. all the big economic actors) however could shard into as many shards as necessary without making the system less secure. Todays DLTs waste trust in the same way as PoW wastes energy.
HusQy
Is a secure money worth anything if you can't trust the economic actors that you would buy stuff from? If you buy a car from Volkswagen and they just beat you up and throw you out of the shop after you payed then a secure money won't be useful either :P
HusQy
**I believe that if you want to make DLT work and be successful then we need to ultimately incorporate things like trust in entities into the technology.**Examples likes wirecard show that trusting a single company is problematic but trusting the economy as a whole should be at ...
**... least as secure as todays DLTs.**And as soon as you add sharding it will be orders of magnitude more secure. DLT has failed to deliver because people have tried to build a system in vacuum that completely ignores things that already exist and that you can leverage on.
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HusQy
Blockchain is a bit like people sitting in a room, trying to communicate through BINGO sheets. While they talk, they write down some of the things that have been said and as soon as one screams BINGO! he hands around his sheet to inform everybody about what has been said.
HusQy
If you think that this is the most efficient form of communication for people sitting in the same room and the answer to scalability is to make bigger BINGO sheets or to allow people to solve the puzzle faster then you will most probably never understand what IOTA is working on.
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HusQy
**Blockchain does not work with too many equally weighted validators.****If 400 validators produce a validating statement (block) at the same time then only one can survive as part of a longest chain.**IOTA is all about collaborative validation.
**Another problem of blockchain is that every transaction gets sent twice through the network. Once from the nodes to the miners and a 2nd time from the miners as part of a block.**Blockchain will therefore always only be able to use 50% of the network throughput.
And****the last problem is that you can not arbitrarily decrease the time between blocks as it breaks down if the time between blocks gets smaller than the average network delay. The idle time between blocks is precious time that could be used for processing transactions.
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HusQy
I am not talking about a system with a fixed number of validators but one that is completely open and permissionless where any new company can just spin up a node and take part in the network.
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HusQy
Proof of Work and Proof of Stake are both centralizing sybil-protection mechanism. I don't think that Satoshi wanted 14 mining pools to run the network.
And "economic clustering" was always the "end game" of IOTA.
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HusQy
**Using Proof of Stake is not trustless. Proof of Stake means you trust the richest people and hope that they approve your transactions. The rich are getting richer (through your fees) and you are getting more and more dependant on them.**Is that your vision of the future?
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HusQy
Please read again exactly what I wrote. I have not spoken of introducing governance by large companies, nor have I said that IOTA should be permissioned. We aim for a network with millions or even billions of nodes.

HusQy
That can't work at all with a permissioned ledger - who should then drop off all these devices or authorize them to participate in the network? My key message was the following: Proof of Work and Proof of Stake will always be if you split them up via sharding ...

HusQy
... less secure because you simply need fewer coins or less hash power to have the majority of the votes in a shard. This is not the case with trust in society and the economy. When all companies in the world jointly secure a DLT ...

HusQy
... then these companies could install any number of servers in any number of shards without compromising security, because "trust" does not become less just because they operate several servers. First of all, that is a fact and nothing else.

HusQy
Proof of Work and Proof of Stake are contrary to the assumption of many not "trustless" but follow the maxim: "In the greed of miners we trust!" The basic assumption that the miners do not destroy the system that generates income for them is fundamental here for the ...

HusQy
... security of every DLT. I think a similar assumption would still be correct for the economy as a whole: The companies of the world (and not just the big ones) would not destroy the system with which their customers pay them. In this respect, a system would be ...

HusQy
... which is validated by society and the economy as a whole probably just as "safely" as a system which is validated by a few anonymous miners. Why a small elite of miners should be better validators than any human and ...

HusQy
... To be honest, companies in this world do not open up to me. As already written in my other thread, safe money does not bring you anything if you have to assume that Volkswagen will beat you up and throw you out of the store after you ...

HusQy
... paid for a car. The thoughts I discussed say nothing about the immediate future of IOTA (we use for Coordicide mana) but rather speak of a world where DLT has already become an integral part of our lives and we ...

HusQy
... a corresponding number of companies, non-profit organizations and people have used DLT and where such a system could be implemented. The point here is not to create a governance solution that in any way influences the development of technology ...

HusQy
... or have to give nodes their OK first, but about developing a system that enables people to freely choose the validators they trust. For example, you can also declare your grandma to be a validator when you install your node or your ...

HusQy
... local supermarket. Economic relationships in the real world usually form a close-knit network and it doesn't really matter who you follow as long as the majority is honest. I also don't understand your criticism of censorship, because something like that in IOTA ...

HusQy
... is almost impossible. Each transaction confirms two other transactions which is growing exponentially. If someone wanted to ignore a transaction, he would have to ignore an exponential number of other transactions after a very short time. In contrast to blockchain ...

HusQy
... validators in IOTA do not decide what is included in the ledger, but only decide which of several double spends should be confirmed. Honest transactions are confirmed simply by having other transactions reference them ...

HusQy
... and the "validators" are not even asked. As for the "dust problem", this is indeed something that is a bigger problem for IOTA than for other DLTs because we have no fees, but it is also not an unsolvable problem. Bitcoin initially has a ...

HusQy
Solved similar problem by declaring outputs with a minimum amount of 5430 satoshis as invalid ( github.com/Bitcoin/Bitcoi…). A similar solution where an address must contain a minimum amount is also conceivable for IOTA and we are discussing ...

HusQy
... several possibilities (including compressing dust using cryptographic methods). Contrary to your assumption, checking such a minimum amount is not slow but just as fast as checking a normal transaction. And mine ...

HusQy
... In my opinion this is no problem at all for IOTA's use case. The important thing is that you can send small amounts, but after IOTA is feeless it is also okay to expect the recipients to regularly send their payments on a ...

HusQy
... merge address. The wallets already do this automatically (sweeping) and for machines it is no problem to automate this process. So far this was not a problem because the TPS were limited but with the increased TPS throughput of ...

HusQy
... Chrysalis it becomes relevant and appropriate solutions are discussed and then implemented accordingly. I think that was the most important thing first and if you have further questions just write :)

HusQy
And to be very clear! I really appreciate you and your questions and don't see this as an attack at all! People who see such questions as inappropriate criticism should really ask whether they are still objective. I have little time at the moment because ...

HusQy
... my girlfriend is on tour and has to take care of our daughter, but as soon as she is back we can discuss these things in a video. I think that the concept of including the "real world" in the concepts of DLT is really exciting and ...

HusQy
... that would certainly be exciting to discuss in a joint video. But again, that's more of a vision than a specific plan for the immediate future. This would not work with blockchain anyway but IOTA would be compatible so why not think about such things.
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HusQy
All good my big one :P But actually not that much has changed. There has always been the concept of "economic clustering" which is basically based on similar ideas. We are just now able to implement things like this for the first time.
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HusQy
Exactly. It would mean that addresses "cost" something but I would rather pay a few cents than fees for each transaction. And you can "take" this minimum amount with you every time you change to a new address.

HusQy
All good my big one :P But actually not that much has changed. There has always been the concept of "economic clustering" which is basically based on similar ideas. We are just now able to implement things like this for the first time.
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Relax오늘 오전 1:17
Btw. Hans (sorry for interrupting this convo) but what make people say that IOTA is going the permissioned way because of your latest tweets? I don't get why some people are now forecasting that... Is it because of missing specs or do they just don't get the whole idea?

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:20
its bullshit u/Relaxan identity based system would still be open and permissionless where everybody can choose the actors that they deem trustworthy themselves but thats anyway just sth that would be applicable with more adoption
[오전 1:20]
for now we use mana as a predecessor to an actual reputation system

Sissors오늘 오전 1:31
If everybody has to choose actors they deem trustworthy, is it still permissionless? Probably will become a bit a semantic discussion, but still

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:34
Of course its permissionless you can follow your grandma if you want to :p

Sissors오늘 오전 1:36
Well sure you can, but you will need to follow something which has a majority of the voting power in the network. Nice that you follow your grandma, but if others dont, her opinion (or well her nodes opinion) is completely irrelevant

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:37
You would ideally follow the people that are trustworthy rather than your local drug dealers yeah

Sissors오늘 오전 1:38
And tbh, sure if you do it like that is easy. If you just make the users responsible for only connection to trustworthy nodes

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:38
And if your grandma follows her supermarket and some other people she deems trustworthy then thats fine as well
[오전 1:38]
+ you dont have just 1 actor that you follow

Sissors오늘 오전 1:38
No, you got a large list, since yo uwant to follow those which actually matter. So you jsut download a standard list from the internet

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:39
You can do that
[오전 1:39]
Is bitcoin permissionless? Should we both try to become miners?
[오전 1:41]
I mean miners that actually matter and not find a block every 10 trillion years 📷
[오전 1:42]
If you would want to become a validator then you would need to build up trust among other people - but anybody can still run a node and issue transactions unlike in hashgraph where you are not able to run your own nodes(수정됨)
[오전 1:48]
Proof of Stake is also not trustless - it just has a builtin mechanism that downloads the trusted people from the blockchain itself (the richest dudes)

Sissors오늘 오전 1:52
I think most agree it would be perfect if every person had one vote. Which is pr oblematic to implement of course. But I really wonder if the solution is to just let users decide who to trust. At the very least I expect a quite centralized network

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:53
of course even a trust based system would to a certain degree be centralized as not every person is equally trustworthy as for example a big cooperation
[오전 1:53]
but I think its gonna be less centralized than PoS or PoW
[오전 1:53]
but anyway its sth for "after coordicide"
[오전 1:54]
there are not enough trusted entities that are using DLT, yet to make such a system work reasonably well
[오전 1:54]
I think the reason why blockchain has not really started to look into these kind of concepts is because blockchain doesnt work with too many equally weighted validators
[오전 1:56]
I believe that DLT is only going to take over the world if it is actually "better" than existing systems and with better I mean cheaper, more secure and faster and PoS and PoW will have a very hard time to deliver that
[오전 1:56]
especially if you consider that its not only going to settle value transfers

Relax오늘 오전 1:57
I like this clear statements, it makes it really clear that DLT is still in its infancy

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:57
currently bank transfers are order of magnitude cheaper than BTC or ETH transactions

Hans Moog [IF]오늘 오전 1:57
and we you think that people will adopt it just because its crypto then I think we are mistaken
[오전 1:57]
The tech needs to actually solve a problem
[오전 1:57]
and tbh. currently people use PayPal and other companies to settle their payments
[오전 1:58]
having a group of the top 500 companies run such a service together is already much better(수정됨)
[오전 1:58]
especially if its fast and feeless
[오전 2:02]
and the more people use it, the more decentralized it actually becomes
[오전 2:02]
because you have more trustworthy entities to choose of

Evaldas [IF]오늘 오전 2:08
"in the greed of miners we trust"


submitted by btlkhs to Iota [link] [comments]

All you need to know about Yield Farming - The rocket fuel for Defi

All you need to know about Yield Farming - The rocket fuel for Defi
Source
It’s effectively July 2017 in the world of decentralized finance (DeFi), and as in the heady days of the initial coin offering (ICO) boom, the numbers are only trending up.
According to DeFi Pulse, there is $1.9 billion in crypto assets locked in DeFi right now. According to the CoinDesk ICO Tracker, the ICO market started chugging past $1 billion in July 2017, just a few months before token sales started getting talked about on TV.
Debate juxtaposing these numbers if you like, but what no one can question is this: Crypto users are putting more and more value to work in DeFi applications, driven largely by the introduction of a whole new yield-generating pasture, Compound’s COMP governance token.
Governance tokens enable users to vote on the future of decentralized protocols, sure, but they also present fresh ways for DeFi founders to entice assets onto their platforms.
That said, it’s the crypto liquidity providers who are the stars of the present moment. They even have a meme-worthy name: yield farmers.

https://preview.redd.it/lxsvazp1g9l51.png?width=775&format=png&auto=webp&s=a36173ab679c701a5d5e0aac806c00fcc84d78c1

Where it started

Ethereum-based credit market Compound started distributing its governance token, COMP, to the protocol’s users this past June 15. Demand for the token (heightened by the way its automatic distribution was structured) kicked off the present craze and moved Compound into the leading position in DeFi.
The hot new term in crypto is “yield farming,” a shorthand for clever strategies where putting crypto temporarily at the disposal of some startup’s application earns its owner more cryptocurrency.
Another term floating about is “liquidity mining.”
The buzz around these concepts has evolved into a low rumble as more and more people get interested.
The casual crypto observer who only pops into the market when activity heats up might be starting to get faint vibes that something is happening right now. Take our word for it: Yield farming is the source of those vibes.
But if all these terms (“DeFi,” “liquidity mining,” “yield farming”) are so much Greek to you, fear not. We’re here to catch you up. We’ll get into all of them.
We’re going to go from very basic to more advanced, so feel free to skip ahead.

What are tokens?

Most CoinDesk readers probably know this, but just in case: Tokens are like the money video-game players earn while fighting monsters, money they can use to buy gear or weapons in the universe of their favorite game.
But with blockchains, tokens aren’t limited to only one massively multiplayer online money game. They can be earned in one and used in lots of others. They usually represent either ownership in something (like a piece of a Uniswap liquidity pool, which we will get into later) or access to some service. For example, in the Brave browser, ads can only be bought using basic attention token (BAT).
If tokens are worth money, then you can bank with them or at least do things that look very much like banking. Thus: decentralized finance.
Tokens proved to be the big use case for Ethereum, the second-biggest blockchain in the world. The term of art here is “ERC-20 tokens,” which refers to a software standard that allows token creators to write rules for them. Tokens can be used a few ways. Often, they are used as a form of money within a set of applications. So the idea for Kin was to create a token that web users could spend with each other at such tiny amounts that it would almost feel like they weren’t spending anything; that is, money for the internet.
Governance tokens are different. They are not like a token at a video-game arcade, as so many tokens were described in the past. They work more like certificates to serve in an ever-changing legislature in that they give holders the right to vote on changes to a protocol.
So on the platform that proved DeFi could fly, MakerDAO, holders of its governance token, MKR, vote almost every week on small changes to parameters that govern how much it costs to borrow and how much savers earn, and so on.
Read more: Why DeFi’s Billion-Dollar Milestone Matters
One thing all crypto tokens have in common, though, is they are tradable and they have a price. So, if tokens are worth money, then you can bank with them or at least do things that look very much like banking. Thus: decentralized finance.

What is DeFi?

Fair question. For folks who tuned out for a bit in 2018, we used to call this “open finance.” That construction seems to have faded, though, and “DeFi” is the new lingo.
In case that doesn’t jog your memory, DeFi is all the things that let you play with money, and the only identification you need is a crypto wallet.
On the normal web, you can’t buy a blender without giving the site owner enough data to learn your whole life history. In DeFi, you can borrow money without anyone even asking for your name.
I can explain this but nothing really brings it home like trying one of these applications. If you have an Ethereum wallet that has even $20 worth of crypto in it, go do something on one of these products. Pop over to Uniswap and buy yourself some FUN (a token for gambling apps) or WBTC (wrapped bitcoin). Go to MakerDAO and create $5 worth of DAI (a stablecoin that tends to be worth $1) out of the digital ether. Go to Compound and borrow $10 in USDC.
(Notice the very small amounts I’m suggesting. The old crypto saying “don’t put in more than you can afford to lose” goes double for DeFi. This stuff is uber-complex and a lot can go wrong. These may be “savings” products but they’re not for your retirement savings.)
Immature and experimental though it may be, the technology’s implications are staggering. On the normal web, you can’t buy a blender without giving the site owner enough data to learn your whole life history. In DeFi, you can borrow money without anyone even asking for your name.
DeFi applications don’t worry about trusting you because they have the collateral you put up to back your debt (on Compound, for instance, a $10 debt will require around $20 in collateral).
Read more: There Are More DAI on Compound Now Than There Are DAI in the World
If you do take this advice and try something, note that you can swap all these things back as soon as you’ve taken them out. Open the loan and close it 10 minutes later. It’s fine. Fair warning: It might cost you a tiny bit in fees, and the cost of using Ethereum itself right now is much higher than usual, in part due to this fresh new activity. But it’s nothing that should ruin a crypto user.
So what’s the point of borrowing for people who already have the money? Most people do it for some kind of trade. The most obvious example, to short a token (the act of profiting if its price falls). It’s also good for someone who wants to hold onto a token but still play the market.

Doesn’t running a bank take a lot of money up front?

It does, and in DeFi that money is largely provided by strangers on the internet. That’s why the startups behind these decentralized banking applications come up with clever ways to attract HODLers with idle assets.
Liquidity is the chief concern of all these different products. That is: How much money do they have locked in their smart contracts?
“In some types of products, the product experience gets much better if you have liquidity. Instead of borrowing from VCs or debt investors, you borrow from your users,” said Electric Capital managing partner Avichal Garg.
Let’s take Uniswap as an example. Uniswap is an “automated market maker,” or AMM (another DeFi term of art). This means Uniswap is a robot on the internet that is always willing to buy and it’s also always willing to sell any cryptocurrency for which it has a market.
On Uniswap, there is at least one market pair for almost any token on Ethereum. Behind the scenes, this means Uniswap can make it look like it is making a direct trade for any two tokens, which makes it easy for users, but it’s all built around pools of two tokens. And all these market pairs work better with bigger pools.

Why do I keep hearing about ‘pools’?

To illustrate why more money helps, let’s break down how Uniswap works.
Let’s say there was a market for USDC and DAI. These are two tokens (both stablecoins but with different mechanisms for retaining their value) that are meant to be worth $1 each all the time, and that generally tends to be true for both.
The price Uniswap shows for each token in any pooled market pair is based on the balance of each in the pool. So, simplifying this a lot for illustration’s sake, if someone were to set up a USDC/DAI pool, they should deposit equal amounts of both. In a pool with only 2 USDC and 2 DAI it would offer a price of 1 USDC for 1 DAI. But then imagine that someone put in 1 DAI and took out 1 USDC. Then the pool would have 1 USDC and 3 DAI. The pool would be very out of whack. A savvy investor could make an easy $0.50 profit by putting in 1 USDC and receiving 1.5 DAI. That’s a 50% arbitrage profit, and that’s the problem with limited liquidity.
(Incidentally, this is why Uniswap’s prices tend to be accurate, because traders watch it for small discrepancies from the wider market and trade them away for arbitrage profits very quickly.)
Read more: Uniswap V2 Launches With More Token-Swap Pairs, Oracle Service, Flash Loans
However, if there were 500,000 USDC and 500,000 DAI in the pool, a trade of 1 DAI for 1 USDC would have a negligible impact on the relative price. That’s why liquidity is helpful.
You can stick your assets on Compound and earn a little yield. But that’s not very creative. Users who look for angles to maximize that yield: those are the yield farmers.
Similar effects hold across DeFi, so markets want more liquidity. Uniswap solves this by charging a tiny fee on every trade. It does this by shaving off a little bit from each trade and leaving that in the pool (so one DAI would actually trade for 0.997 USDC, after the fee, growing the overall pool by 0.003 USDC). This benefits liquidity providers because when someone puts liquidity in the pool they own a share of the pool. If there has been lots of trading in that pool, it has earned a lot of fees, and the value of each share will grow.
And this brings us back to tokens.
Liquidity added to Uniswap is represented by a token, not an account. So there’s no ledger saying, “Bob owns 0.000000678% of the DAI/USDC pool.” Bob just has a token in his wallet. And Bob doesn’t have to keep that token. He could sell it. Or use it in another product. We’ll circle back to this, but it helps to explain why people like to talk about DeFi products as “money Legos.”

So how much money do people make by putting money into these products?

It can be a lot more lucrative than putting money in a traditional bank, and that’s before startups started handing out governance tokens.
Compound is the current darling of this space, so let’s use it as an illustration. As of this writing, a person can put USDC into Compound and earn 2.72% on it. They can put tether (USDT) into it and earn 2.11%. Most U.S. bank accounts earn less than 0.1% these days, which is close enough to nothing.
However, there are some caveats. First, there’s a reason the interest rates are so much juicier: DeFi is a far riskier place to park your money. There’s no Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) protecting these funds. If there were a run on Compound, users could find themselves unable to withdraw their funds when they wanted.
Plus, the interest is quite variable. You don’t know what you’ll earn over the course of a year. USDC’s rate is high right now. It was low last week. Usually, it hovers somewhere in the 1% range.
Similarly, a user might get tempted by assets with more lucrative yields like USDT, which typically has a much higher interest rate than USDC. (Monday morning, the reverse was true, for unclear reasons; this is crypto, remember.) The trade-off here is USDT’s transparency about the real-world dollars it’s supposed to hold in a real-world bank is not nearly up to par with USDC’s. A difference in interest rates is often the market’s way of telling you the one instrument is viewed as dicier than another.
Users making big bets on these products turn to companies Opyn and Nexus Mutual to insure their positions because there’s no government protections in this nascent space – more on the ample risks later on.
So users can stick their assets in Compound or Uniswap and earn a little yield. But that’s not very creative. Users who look for angles to maximize that yield: those are the yield farmers.

OK, I already knew all of that. What is yield farming?

Broadly, yield farming is any effort to put crypto assets to work and generate the most returns possible on those assets.
At the simplest level, a yield farmer might move assets around within Compound, constantly chasing whichever pool is offering the best APY from week to week. This might mean moving into riskier pools from time to time, but a yield farmer can handle risk.
“Farming opens up new price arbs [arbitrage] that can spill over to other protocols whose tokens are in the pool,” said Maya Zehavi, a blockchain consultant.
Because these positions are tokenized, though, they can go further.
This was a brand-new kind of yield on a deposit. In fact, it was a way to earn a yield on a loan. Who has ever heard of a borrower earning a return on a debt from their lender?
In a simple example, a yield farmer might put 100,000 USDT into Compound. They will get a token back for that stake, called cUSDT. Let’s say they get 100,000 cUSDT back (the formula on Compound is crazy so it’s not 1:1 like that but it doesn’t matter for our purposes here).
They can then take that cUSDT and put it into a liquidity pool that takes cUSDT on Balancer, an AMM that allows users to set up self-rebalancing crypto index funds. In normal times, this could earn a small amount more in transaction fees. This is the basic idea of yield farming. The user looks for edge cases in the system to eke out as much yield as they can across as many products as it will work on.
Right now, however, things are not normal, and they probably won’t be for a while.

Why is yield farming so hot right now?

Because of liquidity mining. Liquidity mining supercharges yield farming.
Liquidity mining is when a yield farmer gets a new token as well as the usual return (that’s the “mining” part) in exchange for the farmer’s liquidity.
“The idea is that stimulating usage of the platform increases the value of the token, thereby creating a positive usage loop to attract users,” said Richard Ma of smart-contract auditor Quantstamp.
The yield farming examples above are only farming yield off the normal operations of different platforms. Supply liquidity to Compound or Uniswap and get a little cut of the business that runs over the protocols – very vanilla.
But Compound announced earlier this year it wanted to truly decentralize the product and it wanted to give a good amount of ownership to the people who made it popular by using it. That ownership would take the form of the COMP token.
Lest this sound too altruistic, keep in mind that the people who created it (the team and the investors) owned more than half of the equity. By giving away a healthy proportion to users, that was very likely to make it a much more popular place for lending. In turn, that would make everyone’s stake worth much more.
So, Compound announced this four-year period where the protocol would give out COMP tokens to users, a fixed amount every day until it was gone. These COMP tokens control the protocol, just as shareholders ultimately control publicly traded companies.
Every day, the Compound protocol looks at everyone who had lent money to the application and who had borrowed from it and gives them COMP proportional to their share of the day’s total business.
The results were very surprising, even to Compound’s biggest promoters.
COMP’s value will likely go down, and that’s why some investors are rushing to earn as much of it as they can right now.
This was a brand-new kind of yield on a deposit into Compound. In fact, it was a way to earn a yield on a loan, as well, which is very weird: Who has ever heard of a borrower earning a return on a debt from their lender?
COMP’s value has consistently been well over $200 since it started distributing on June 15. We did the math elsewhere but long story short: investors with fairly deep pockets can make a strong gain maximizing their daily returns in COMP. It is, in a way, free money.
It’s possible to lend to Compound, borrow from it, deposit what you borrowed and so on. This can be done multiple times and DeFi startup Instadapp even built a tool to make it as capital-efficient as possible.
“Yield farmers are extremely creative. They find ways to ‘stack’ yields and even earn multiple governance tokens at once,” said Spencer Noon of DTC Capital.
COMP’s value spike is a temporary situation. The COMP distribution will only last four years and then there won’t be any more. Further, most people agree that the high price now is driven by the low float (that is, how much COMP is actually free to trade on the market – it will never be this low again). So the value will probably gradually go down, and that’s why savvy investors are trying to earn as much as they can now.
Appealing to the speculative instincts of diehard crypto traders has proven to be a great way to increase liquidity on Compound. This fattens some pockets but also improves the user experience for all kinds of Compound users, including those who would use it whether they were going to earn COMP or not.
As usual in crypto, when entrepreneurs see something successful, they imitate it. Balancer was the next protocol to start distributing a governance token, BAL, to liquidity providers. Flash loan provider bZx has announced a plan. Ren, Curve and Synthetix also teamed up to promote a liquidity pool on Curve.
It is a fair bet many of the more well-known DeFi projects will announce some kind of coin that can be mined by providing liquidity.
The case to watch here is Uniswap versus Balancer. Balancer can do the same thing Uniswap does, but most users who want to do a quick token trade through their wallet use Uniswap. It will be interesting to see if Balancer’s BAL token convinces Uniswap’s liquidity providers to defect.
So far, though, more liquidity has gone into Uniswap since the BAL announcement, according to its data site. That said, even more has gone into Balancer.

Did liquidity mining start with COMP?

No, but it was the most-used protocol with the most carefully designed liquidity mining scheme.
This point is debated but the origins of liquidity mining probably date back to Fcoin, a Chinese exchange that created a token in 2018 that rewarded people for making trades. You won’t believe what happened next! Just kidding, you will: People just started running bots to do pointless trades with themselves to earn the token.
Similarly, EOS is a blockchain where transactions are basically free, but since nothing is really free the absence of friction was an invitation for spam. Some malicious hacker who didn’t like EOS created a token called EIDOS on the network in late 2019. It rewarded people for tons of pointless transactions and somehow got an exchange listing.
These initiatives illustrated how quickly crypto users respond to incentives.
Read more: Compound Changes COMP Distribution Rules Following ‘Yield Farming’ Frenzy
Fcoin aside, liquidity mining as we now know it first showed up on Ethereum when the marketplace for synthetic tokens, Synthetix, announced in July 2019 an award in its SNX token for users who helped add liquidity to the sETH/ETH pool on Uniswap. By October, that was one of Uniswap’s biggest pools.
When Compound Labs, the company that launched the Compound protocol, decided to create COMP, the governance token, the firm took months designing just what kind of behavior it wanted and how to incentivize it. Even still, Compound Labs was surprised by the response. It led to unintended consequences such as crowding into a previously unpopular market (lending and borrowing BAT) in order to mine as much COMP as possible.
Just last week, 115 different COMP wallet addresses – senators in Compound’s ever-changing legislature – voted to change the distribution mechanism in hopes of spreading liquidity out across the markets again.

Is there DeFi for bitcoin?

Yes, on Ethereum.
Nothing has beaten bitcoin over time for returns, but there’s one thing bitcoin can’t do on its own: create more bitcoin.
A smart trader can get in and out of bitcoin and dollars in a way that will earn them more bitcoin, but this is tedious and risky. It takes a certain kind of person.
DeFi, however, offers ways to grow one’s bitcoin holdings – though somewhat indirectly.
A long HODLer is happy to gain fresh BTC off their counterparty’s short-term win. That’s the game.
For example, a user can create a simulated bitcoin on Ethereum using BitGo’s WBTC system. They put BTC in and get the same amount back out in freshly minted WBTC. WBTC can be traded back for BTC at any time, so it tends to be worth the same as BTC.
Then the user can take that WBTC, stake it on Compound and earn a few percent each year in yield on their BTC. Odds are, the people who borrow that WBTC are probably doing it to short BTC (that is, they will sell it immediately, buy it back when the price goes down, close the loan and keep the difference).
A long HODLer is happy to gain fresh BTC off their counterparty’s short-term win. That’s the game.

How risky is it?

Enough.
“DeFi, with the combination of an assortment of digital funds, automation of key processes, and more complex incentive structures that work across protocols – each with their own rapidly changing tech and governance practices – make for new types of security risks,” said Liz Steininger of Least Authority, a crypto security auditor. “Yet, despite these risks, the high yields are undeniably attractive to draw more users.”
We’ve seen big failures in DeFi products. MakerDAO had one so bad this year it’s called “Black Thursday.” There was also the exploit against flash loan provider bZx. These things do break and when they do money gets taken.
As this sector gets more robust, we could see token holders greenlighting more ways for investors to profit from DeFi niches.
Right now, the deal is too good for certain funds to resist, so they are moving a lot of money into these protocols to liquidity mine all the new governance tokens they can. But the funds – entities that pool the resources of typically well-to-do crypto investors – are also hedging. Nexus Mutual, a DeFi insurance provider of sorts, told CoinDesk it has maxed out its available coverage on these liquidity applications. Opyn, the trustless derivatives maker, created a way to short COMP, just in case this game comes to naught.
And weird things have arisen. For example, there’s currently more DAI on Compound than have been minted in the world. This makes sense once unpacked but it still feels dicey to everyone.
That said, distributing governance tokens might make things a lot less risky for startups, at least with regard to the money cops.
“Protocols distributing their tokens to the public, meaning that there’s a new secondary listing for SAFT tokens, [gives] plausible deniability from any security accusation,” Zehavi wrote. (The Simple Agreement for Future Tokens was a legal structure favored by many token issuers during the ICO craze.)
Whether a cryptocurrency is adequately decentralized has been a key feature of ICO settlements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

What’s next for yield farming? (A prediction)

COMP turned out to be a bit of a surprise to the DeFi world, in technical ways and others. It has inspired a wave of new thinking.
“Other projects are working on similar things,” said Nexus Mutual founder Hugh Karp. In fact, informed sources tell CoinDesk brand-new projects will launch with these models.
We might soon see more prosaic yield farming applications. For example, forms of profit-sharing that reward certain kinds of behavior.
Imagine if COMP holders decided, for example, that the protocol needed more people to put money in and leave it there longer. The community could create a proposal that shaved off a little of each token’s yield and paid that portion out only to the tokens that were older than six months. It probably wouldn’t be much, but an investor with the right time horizon and risk profile might take it into consideration before making a withdrawal.
(There are precedents for this in traditional finance: A 10-year Treasury bond normally yields more than a one-month T-bill even though they’re both backed by the full faith and credit of Uncle Sam, a 12-month certificate of deposit pays higher interest than a checking account at the same bank, and so on.)
As this sector gets more robust, its architects will come up with ever more robust ways to optimize liquidity incentives in increasingly refined ways. We could see token holders greenlighting more ways for investors to profit from DeFi niches.
Questions abound for this nascent industry: What will MakerDAO do to restore its spot as the king of DeFi? Will Uniswap join the liquidity mining trend? Will anyone stick all these governance tokens into a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)? Or would that be a yield farmers co-op?
Whatever happens, crypto’s yield farmers will keep moving fast. Some fresh fields may open and some may soon bear much less luscious fruit.
But that’s the nice thing about farming in DeFi: It is very easy to switch fields.
submitted by pascalbernoulli to Yield_Farming [link] [comments]

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history
The original intention of this article is to let readers understand the causes and consequences of Bitmain internal fighting, but after writing it, I found that it is not so much internal fighting as it is a long history of self-help.
The story is very long. Let's adjust the timeline to the eve of December 17, 2018. That was one of Bitmain's most critical moments and the beginning of a series of subsequent stories.
1. Self-immolation In September 2018, Bitmain's financial department warned management that the company's cash flow has become very tight and operating costs must be reduced to allow the company to continue. The blockchain unicorn, which is valued at more than 15 billion U.S. dollars, is crippled in the run and struggling to break the corner.
In 2017, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars In the first half of 2018, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars Three rounds of financing, a total of 800 million US dollars Net assets should exceed 3 billion U.S. dollars In September 2018, Bitmain had tight cash flow and was on the verge of bankruptcy
A simple comparison, it is not difficult to see that Bitmain's ability to make money is incredible, and its ability to burn money is even more extreme.
How does Bitmain burn money? Do you pour cash into gasoline and burn it, or hire a lot of employees to stuff the banknotes one by one into the shredder? The actual situation is closer to the latter.
The following data can help readers quickly learn Bitmain's money burning skills.
At the beginning of 2018, the entire cryptocurrency market has entered a bear market, but Bitmain's monthly operating costs have been rising wildly. Operating costs have risen from 10 million US dollars at the beginning of the year to 50 million US dollars at the end of the year.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
Operating costs are just the tip of the iceberg. Excessive chip trial production can become a classic case of project management courses. Readers who pay attention to Cryptocurrency mining can easily find that Bitmain is still working hard to clear the inventory of Antminer S9 in 2019. As the co-CEO, Ketuan Zhan did not listen to the advice or even warnings of the Finance Department, insisting on the implementation of Excessive chip trial production, resulting in a large accumulation of inventory and tight capital turnover. Another CEO, Jihan Wu, once revealed that the loss of Excessive chip trial production to the company was approximately US$1.5 billion.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
The BM1393 chip incident is even more incredible. Chip expert Ketuan Zhan invested a lot of money on a failed chip, and finally failed again. From 2017 to 2018, Bitmain has failed Trial production of mining machine chips at least 4 times, including 16nm, 12nm and 10nm chips, of which 16nm Trial production failed twice, thus losing at least US$1.2 billion.
It is rumored that Bitmain still holds a billion U.S. dollars worth of cryptocurrency in a state of floating loss. In view of the rebound in the market in 2020, we will not comment temporarily, waiting for the correct answer from the cryptocurrency market. But the losses pointed out in the previous article are all irreversible.
2. Sole power
In September 2018, Bitmain's management realized the seriousness of the problem. It turned out that the company's money could be squandered. As a result, the management began to discuss self-help plans, and the most reasonable and effective way was obviously to lay off employees.
The probation period for newly hired employees at Bitmain is half a year, and the probationary salary is 100% of the official salary, there is no difference. Once layoffs are made, new employees who have not passed the probationary period will be the main layoff targets. The department managed by Ketuan Zhan will face large-scale layoffs. The layoff plan is strongly opposed by Ketuan Zhan. Bitmain can only temporarily abandon the layoffs and replace it with continuous reductions. For marketing and travel expenses, a budget committee was established to strictly approve every expenditure. At the same time, employee benefits, such as reimbursement of taxi expenses, breakfast supply, snacks and drinks, etc., have also been abolished, and even the tradition of giving employees 400 yuan worth of BTC/BCH every month has been stopped.
In the face of huge cash flow pressure, trivial savings is obviously of no avail. Soon, the management again discussed the layoff plan, and it has reached the point where it has to be laid off.
In December 2018, Jihan Wu began to organize all entrepreneurial veterans and business backbones to persuade Ketuan Zhan to agree to layoffs, but Ketuan Zhan still insisted not to layoffs. The persuasion process was very unsuccessful. After many meetings and intense debates, Bitmain executives were caught in a dilemma of wasting time with Ketuan Zhan.
In this process, the shortcomings of the dual CEO system began to appear, and the relationship between the two CEOs gradually deteriorated.
On the night of December 16th, Ketuan Zhan reconvened the management meeting, and more than 30 managements who were present were asked to hand over their mobile phones. At this time, Jihan Wu was on a business trip in Hong Kong and was busy with listing related work.
In the meeting, Ketuan Zhan's core content was three items:
(1) Bitmain cannot have two CEOs, only one CEO and must be Ketuan Zhan. Ketuan Zhan said that he met an old leader during a business trip. He hadn't seen each other for many years. The old leader suggested that the company can only have one CEO, and it must be him. Ketuan Zhan feels that this is a kind of fate, an opportunity given by God.
(2) Ketuan Zhan believes that the company's cash flow problems, the biggest responsibility is the inability of the financial department. To prove his point, Ketuan Zhan announced Bitmain's financial data at the meeting. In the evening, employees in Taiwan began to post messages on social media, saying that the company's capital chain was broken and the top management was split.
(3) If Ketuan Zhan is not supported, the option will be cancelled and the equity will be voided.
Hearing about this, Jihan Wu, who lives in Hong Kong, sent a WeChat message to the management who are attending the meeting.

https://preview.redd.it/zkj2d44tqid51.jpg?width=1080&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=9251c1f7308e155d7911d5969e71091a5ad5e14a
On the afternoon of December 17, 2018, Jihan Wu returned to Beijing to negotiate with Ketuan Zhan all night, and finally reached a consensus in the early morning. Bitmain co-founder Yuesheng Ge announced the results of the negotiations. Jihan Wu and Ketuan Zhan ceased to serve as CEOs, and Haichao Wang served as CEO. Jihan Wu voluntarily backed down and Ketuan Zhan served as chairman.
The "12.17 Incident" had a very bad impact on Bitmain, especially the disclosure of Bitmain's financial status, which caused vendors to start dunning. The loan that had just been negotiated with the Bank of Beijing was cancelled the next day. Jihan Wu's resignation as CEO caused an uproar in the industry, and it became a hot topic among Cryptocurrency mining, blockchain practitioners, and investor communities. The media focused their interpretation on Bitmain's series of incidents, and generally looked down upon its ongoing Hong Kong IPO, believing that the high-level changes had already signaled the failure of the IPO in advance.
On Christmas December 24, 2018, Bitmain finally began to implement the layoff plan. This long-delayed “correct decision” was achieved after a stalemate for nearly three months. The AI ​​teams in Beijing, Singapore, Taiwan, and Shanghai have laid off more than 50% of their employees. The Israeli R&D center was closed and Shenzhen New Species Technology Co., Ltd., which had been acquired for only ten months, was dissolved, and all employees were laid off. Copernicus, Bitmain's top blockchain development team, was not spared and was wiped out in this layoff. Copernicus and some of the laid-off employees joined the new company Matrixport co-founded by Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge, headquartered in Singapore.
3. Past events when starting a business
After the "12.17 Incident", Jihan Wu gradually faded out of Bitmain's management affairs and turned his attention to the IPO and new company. And this is one of Jihan Wu's major mistakes, he began to let Ketuan Zhan manage Bitmain alone.
In fact, as early as 2013, Jihan Wu planted hidden dangers.
Jihan Wu, an investment banker, was the earliest translator of the Bitcoin white paper. He began to get involved in the cryptocurrency mining industry in 2012. The disappearance of Kaomao and Nangua Zhang's ticket skipping led Jihan Wu to decide to develop his own chip.
In 2013, Jihan Wu established his own mining machine company. Together with Yuesheng Ge, who was only 20 years old, he found Ketuan Zhan, an integrated circuit designer of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to create the protagonist of this article, and later the digital Cryptocurrency mining giant, Bitmain.
Jihan Wu promised Ketuan Zhan that every time a mining machine chip was successfully developed, he would give some shares to the Ketuan Zhan team. At that time, the company founded by Ketuan Zhan was on the eve of falling apart. In order to regroup the team, Ketuan Zhan promised to share half of his shares with the team members. Unfortunately, this is just a bad check. With the rapid development of Bitmain and higher and higher valuations, the expanding Ketuan Zhan almost monopolized all the shares.
Like many startups, Bitmain encountered many difficulties in its early days, and many jobs had to be done by the boss. For example, in the chip design and production process in the second half of 2013, Bitmain was caught in a dilemma of insufficient funds. Jihan Wu personally raised funds and met with TSMC’s sales to persuade TSMC to accept the production needs of a start-up company. Jihan Wu also participated in the selection of the thermodynamic parameters of the heat sink in the Antminer S1.
In 2014, Jihan Wu discovered that this company was independently operated by Ketuan Zhan, which had huge problems. Forcing Jihan Wu to continue to participate in company management.
At that time, Bitmain's mining machine chips had just achieved a certain lead in the standard design process. Jihan Wu believes that the next step must be to develop full customization technology, but Ketuan Zhan plans to invest resources in the research of mobile payment chips.
Ketuan Zhan met a mysterious person from the Party Central Security Bureau who claimed to be able to manipulate the Party Central Committee’s decision-making process for the next generation of mobile payment cryptography standards, but this direction is likely to lead to the fact that Bitmain has just gained the lead in the mining machine market. Regained.
Jihan Wu said that as a graduate of the School of Economics, with a little memory of his high school stage and the knowledge reserve of a computer technology amateur, he retrieves various materials and papers every day, learns theories related to full customization, and goes to Ketuan Zhan conducts persuasion work there.
Fortunately, in the direction of full customization technology, Ketuan Zhan finally listened to Jihan Wu's opinion. Bitmain quickly integrated the technical experts from the United States and Russia introduced by Jihan Wu, which greatly improved the design level of chips and complete machines.
In 2015, Jihan Wu suggested that Ketuan Zhan consider the direction of artificial intelligence. But Ketuan Zhan is not here, he prefers the CPU direction. After staying asleep at night, coupled with in-depth analysis by the Bitmain investment team, Ketuan Zhan finally agreed with this direction. It is a pity that after the Tianshi Chen brothers made major breakthroughs in theory and practice, Bitmain officially invested in the relevant direction, and it was still a step behind.
In the two years from 2016 to 2017, Bitmain's business performance has achieved rapid development, becoming a unique super unicorn in the blockchain industry. According to Froth & Sullivan, in 2017, Bitmain Technology Holdings was the second largest fabless chip design company in China and the tenth largest fabless chip design company in the world, and the fourth largest fabless ASIC chip design company in the world, accounting for 74.5% of global cryptocurrency market share.
However, the huge crisis has long been buried in the early days of entrepreneurship.
Ketuan Zhan's decision on major directions revealed his weakness of extremely lack of business understanding. But every mistake he made was blocked by the company's core employees. His overconfidence in his management ability led to the gradual intensification of conflicts, and the management differences between the two founders became more serious.
4.The giant gets lost
The contradiction between the two broke out on December 17, 2018. Ketuan Zhan used extreme means to force the management to compromise with him by canceling the option, so as to achieve the goal of sole control of the company. Jihan Wu returned to Beijing from Hong Kong overnight and negotiated with Ketuan Zhan all night. In the end, the two resigned as CEO. Jihan Wu retired. Ketuan Zhan has the exclusive rights of chairman in exchange for the implementation of the layoff plan.
Jihan Wu's voluntary retreat has intensified Ketuan Zhan's management to do whatever he wants.
A Bitmain employee commented on Ketuan Zhan's management skills, summed up in two letters-SM.
After becoming the sole helm of the company, Ketuan Zhan quickly "rectified" the department in charge of Jihan Wu as the chairman of the board. He guided the sales of mining machines at the dinner, and pointed out that the sales performance is not due to the sales staff. Ability is strong, but the company provides opportunities. Take two sales leaders as examples, saying that if the company hadn't given the opportunity, they would still be losers. In addition, Ketuan Zhan also instructed the sales staff on how to toast and imparted the wine table culture and experience.
After the meal, Ketuan Zhan came to the conclusion that the quality of Bitmain sales staff was too poor, and Huawei’s blood needs to be injected to drive the company’s progress. Soon, the marketing and sales director from Huawei officially took over Bitmain, opening the era of brand premium for Antminer.
In order to further understand and guide the sales work, Ketuan Zhan asked to meet the customers with the sales staff. During the negotiation process, Ketuan Zhan had a heated discussion with customers on the issue of Chinese and Western medicine, and had also forced the sales staff to be able to ship 10,000 machines due to insufficient production capacity.
Although the requirements for sales personnel are strict, Ketuan Zhan has provided a lot of convenience for "Mainland Ark". In addition to selling mining machines at a more favorable price, Bitmain's mining machines are also hosted in Ming Wang at a higher price than the market price. Mine. It is reported that both Ketuan Zhan and Ming Wang are shareholders of Ark.
The new sales strategy of Huawei's executives has also brought very obvious changes to Bitmain. The self-righteous brand premium reduces the price-performance ratio of Antminer, causing competing products to eat away at Bitmain's market share. Later, Bitmain found that the strategy was wrong and started to cut prices, and found that the mining machine market was saturated and the purchase demand of miners had decreased.
More dangerous than the sales strategy is that the technical advantages of Antminer are being chased by competing products, and even overtaken. At the same time, the two mining pools under Bitmain also lost their first and second positions. The AI ​​business, which Jihan Wu placed high hopes and Ketuan Zhan personally supervised, became a laughing stock in the industry. Not only did it fail to make a profit, it almost brought down Bitmain.
Blindly introducing senior executives from Huawei to occupy important positions completely destroys the company's internal cultural foundation. The bureaucracy within Bitmain began to corrode from high-level employees to ordinary employees. Ketuan Zhan is not aware of this. He is still keen on recruiting Huawei employees, imitating Huawei's organizational structure and strategy, letting HR do sales and R&D personnel to do HR.
The organizational structure adjustment in October 2019 was the fuse for Ketuan Zhan to completely anger Bitmain management. This time, Ketuan Zhan completely marginalized Bitmain’s veteran employees, and suddenly promoted some of the “airborne soldiers” who had just joined the company to the position of person in charge, which caused the former person in charge to report to the new employees. The two managers who were originally equal The hierarchy becomes the subordinate relationship, the operation and development of different business lines are merged into a large department, the upward reporting process becomes more cumbersome, and the relationship between employees becomes delicate.
5. Headwind
On October 29, 2019, Jihan Wu urgently held a staff meeting. Prior to this, the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain has been changed to Jihan Wu, including the parent companies Hong Kong Bitmain and Cayman Bitmain. Jihan Wu stood in the lobby of Building 25, B1, announcing that Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Any employee in the Bitmain Group shall no longer execute Ketuan Zhan’s instructions and participate in any meetings convened by Ketuan Zhan. If there is any violation, the company will demotion and expel the company based on the severity of the circumstances. If losses are caused to the company, the company will be held accountable.
Jihan Wu's speech is very long, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Also expelled from the original Huawei company HR Zhi Wang introduced by Ketuan Zhan at the end of 2018. Zhi Wang’s reputation on Bitmain was extremely poor and was ridiculed by employees as "nine thousand years" (In ancient China, the emperor was called "ten thousand years old", and the prince was "eight thousand years old." However, in the Ming Dynasty, there was an eunuch who caused harm to the country and the people. He called himself "nine thousand years old", meaning that he was only A little lower than the emperor's level).
(2) Ketuan Zhan's ability to control the company's option incentive plan has disappeared, and it is no longer possible to cancel employees' options at will.
(3) The organizational structure adjustment plan led by Ketuan Zhan was suspended.
(4) We are optimistic about the future of AI business, but the premise is that the main business can continue to make profits in order to support the company's continued investment in AI business.
In the speech, Jihan Wu also told employees the whole story of the "12.17 Incident" and bluntly said that the company is not in good condition. If no measures are taken, Bitmain is likely to go bankrupt in three quarters and he must come back to save the company.
At this time, Ketuan Zhan, who was on a business trip in Shenzhen, finally experienced the situation of Jihan Wu in the "12.17 Incident".
After the official return, Jihan Wu began to clearly point out the company's various problems in operation and management, and went deep into each business line to understand the situation. In the mining machine sales department meeting, employees spoke enthusiastically, reflecting on the difficulties and opinions encountered in the work, the marketing and sales director from Huawei asked with a surprised look, "Why didn't these issues be reported to me before?", and soon , The director was interviewed and "voluntarily resigned."
On November 2, 2019, Jihan Wu announced a salary increase for all employees. Bitmain’s last salary increase dates back to 2018. In principle, Bitmain has two salary increases every year.
On November 7, 2019, Ketuan Zhan spoke on social media for the first time, describing his hardship in starting a business, and condemning Jihan Wu for “stabbing a knife in the back”. At the end of the article, he also set himself a KPI for 2020, that is, the mining machine market share will reach 90%, and the AI ​​business will earn 1 billion.
But Ketuan Zhan's majestic plan did not make Bitmain employees feel emotional, but ridiculed him instead. Employees exposed that he insulted employees, advocated Chinese medicine, believed in Buddhism, drank in meetings, practiced Qigong...
However, there is less than half a year before the halving of Bitcoin production, and the cryptocurrency market shows no signs of recovery, which makes Bitmain management very anxious.
On January 6, 2020, Bitmain ushered in another round of layoffs, with a layoff ratio of about 1/3. This time the layoffs have caused many employees who have just increased their salaries to feel very grieved. On the one hand, they were looking forward to Jihan Wu's return. On the other hand, the compensation for this layoff was less than 18 years.
Ketuan Zhan, who has been unable to enter the Bitmain office area, once again spoke on social media and firmly opposed to layoffs. We do not need to lay off staff and we cannot commit suicide.
During the Spring Festival, Covid-19 broke out. Mainland China has begun to extend the Spring Festival holiday and advocate working from home. Under the chain reaction caused by Covid-19, most companies have chosen to cut salaries or even lay off employees. In the first two months of 2020, China's exports fell by 17%, U.S. stocks were broken four times in a row, Bitcoin plunged 40% in 24 hours on March 12, 2020, and crude oil futures fell by 300% on April 20, 2020...
Obviously, Jihan Wu can't predict, but this layoff seems to be the right decision again. In addition, from January to April 2020, Bitmain's revenue exceeded US$400 million amid the spread of Covid-19 and the collapse of the financial market.
6. Fight to the death
When Jihan Wu tried to get the company back on track, Ketuan Zhan was not helpless. On April 28, 2020, Ketuan Zhan finally rolled back the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain to before October 28, 2019 by repeatedly submitting administrative reconsiderations, and restored his status as a legal representative.
On the morning of May 8, 2020, a piece of news about Bitmain quickly appeared on the real-time hot search rankings, and even dominated the headlines of the day. At window 52 on the second floor of the Haidian District Government Affairs Center, when Ketuan Zhan, the legal person of Beijing Bitmain Company, was receiving the business license, a group of unidentified people snatched the business license from the industrial and commercial administrative staff. A source at the scene said that the number of unidentified people in the group was about 60 people, of which Luyao Liu was directing at the scene.
This is a skillful piece of news. It first leads readers to think that Ketuan Zhan is a victim, using 60 people to grab business licenses as the focus. The masses accused Jihan Wu of lawlessness, but ignored whether the government affairs center could have 60 personnel. As for Hong Kong Bitmain to have the right to appoint a representative to obtain a business license, this is a deeper level of thinking.
The follow-up report restored the real situation at the scene. Only more than ten people were present, and both sides were equipped with security personnel. Bitmain employees also broke the news in the circle of friends, claiming that Ketuan Zhan's bodyguard had injured Bitmain's authorized person, and said in a threatening tone, "Be careful!"
However, the subsequent plot reversal did not have much effect. Jihan Wu's reputation has been greatly affected. From a bloody soldier who rescued the company in trouble to a lawless criminal, it can be said to be a world of war. do not.
Ketuan Zhan, who succeeded in the first battle, began to counterattack Bitmain continuously. On the afternoon of June 3, 2020, Ketuan Zhan led a team to pry open the back door of the Beijing Bitmain office and formally occupied the deserted Beijing headquarters.
On June 4, 2020, Ketuan Zhan called on Bitmain employees to resume work and promised to expand the company's market value to more than US$50 billion within three to five years. After that, Ketuan Zhan began to contact employees by phone, trying to acquire the options in the hands of employees at a valuation of 4 billion US dollars.
Subsequently, Ketuan Zhan recalled Huawei's executives and issued a series of personnel appointments and removals. As of June 9, 2020, Ketuan Zhan has successively eliminated CFO Luyao Liu, and Wenguang Wang, the head of the mining center. Luyao Liu is responsible for controlling Bitmain's IPO plan. He also appointed Yanwu Ma as the HR director, Gang Ren as the head of the mining center, Yonggang Sun as the head of the supply chain, Ling Gu as the financial director, and Bin Zhu as the head of the mining machine business department. Bin Zhu is the senior executive of Huawei who was interviewed and left as mentioned in the previous article. During his tenure, he reduced Antminer’s 90% market share to 50%, and received a large number of complaints from miners. Internal employees once speculated that he might be Compete against the spies sent by the company.
In addition to recalling senior executives of Huawei, Ketuan Zhan also urged employees to return to work. They can receive a bonus of 10,000 yuan when they return to work on the same day, which is only half the next day. Ketuan Zhan showed a very kind side. Every time the elevator door is opened, Ketuan Zhan's hot gaze can be met, shaking hands, taking photos, and receiving money. As there is no personnel information, Ketuan Zhan does not know whether the person receiving the money is a Bitmain employee, and these people did not resume work the next day.
The effect of gentleness was not good, Ketuan Zhan began to force employees to return to work. Seeing that there are still very few respondents, Ketuan Zhan threatened employees through SMS, phone calls, EMS, emails and other harassment, issued multiple threats such as termination of contract, suspension of payment of social insurance, suspension of wages, and even used personal information saved by employees to form a group of employees. Domicile threats, requiring employees to perform "work handover", trying to force employees to return work computers, etc.
On June 10, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan had controlled Bitmain's Shenzhen factory and prohibited employees from delivering normal shipments to paid customers, which caused difficulties in the operation of the Bitmain mining machine department.
On June 13, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain, the parent company of Beijing Bitmain, issued a statement accusing Ketuan Zhan of signing a "Sales Agency Agreement" with the Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd. in which it holds shares, in an attempt to embezzle Beijing Bit's assets.
On June 17, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan started selling 14,000 T17+ series mining machines at low prices.
On June 20, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain officially suspended the supply of chips to the Shenzhen factory.
On July 13, 2020, in the "A Letter to All My colleagues in the Shenzhen Factory" released by Bitmain in Hong Kong, more details were added on the series of Ketuan Zhan's actions in June.
The legal person Feng Zhou of the Shenzhen plant is related to Ketuan Zhan. After being relieved of Ketuan Zhan's post, Jihan Wu flew to Shenzhen to have a long talk with Feng Zhou. Jihan Wu believes that Feng Zhou is the right person to manage the factory and help the company overcome difficulties, and decides to leave Feng Zhou to continue to manage the factory.
This wrong decision staged a story of a farmer and a snake. When Ketuan Zhan began to counterattack Bitmain, Feng Zhou was also quickly instigated and began to assist Ketuan Zhan in seizing customer machines and transferring 17,000 T17 mining machines in the warehouse. Hainan Continental Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd., which is held by Ketuan Zhan, sold them at a low price.
In order to protect the interests of customers, Jihan Wu had to make a compromise and paid the payment for some goods to a bank account controlled by Ketuan Zhan in exchange for delivery. However, after the other party received a payment of 109 million, the delivery stopped. On July 8, 2020, 5600 mining machines have been overdue.
At the same time, the factory defaulted on suppliers’ accounts payable as much as 200 million yuan. Bank acceptance bills issued by the factory, exceeding 36 million yuan, will expire on July 17, and more than 34 million yuan will expire on July 23. It is understood that Ketuan Zhan, after receiving the bank's dunning call, made it clear that he would not repay the loan, which would destroy the company and the entire group's credit in financial institutions.
7、 This is not the end
So far, the power struggle between the founders of Bitmain has been more than half a year. The office building already occupied by Ketuan Zhan is still empty, and most employees choose to work from home. Some chip developers returned to the office with the acquiescence of Jihan Wu and continued to maintain research and development to reduce the impact of infighting on technological iteration and competitiveness.
This giant ship that once stood on top of the supercomputer chip is crashing into the iceberg due to the madness of the former helm. Ketuan Zhan's madness and Jihan Wu's compromise made mistakes again and again. Bitmain tried to save himself many times, but was unable to get out of the black hole.
If the time goes back to that day in 2013, would Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge still choose to dial Ketuan Zhan?
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The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history
The original intention of this article is to let readers understand the causes and consequences of Bitmain internal fighting, but after writing it, I found that it is not so much internal fighting as it is a long history of self-help.
The story is very long. Let's adjust the timeline to the eve of December 17, 2018. That was one of Bitmain's most critical moments and the beginning of a series of subsequent stories.
1. Self-immolation In September 2018, Bitmain's financial department warned management that the company's cash flow has become very tight and operating costs must be reduced to allow the company to continue. The blockchain unicorn, which is valued at more than 15 billion U.S. dollars, is crippled in the run and struggling to break the corner.
In 2017, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars In the first half of 2018, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars Three rounds of financing, a total of 800 million US dollars Net assets should exceed 3 billion U.S. dollars In September 2018, Bitmain had tight cash flow and was on the verge of bankruptcy
A simple comparison, it is not difficult to see that Bitmain's ability to make money is incredible, and its ability to burn money is even more extreme.
How does Bitmain burn money? Do you pour cash into gasoline and burn it, or hire a lot of employees to stuff the banknotes one by one into the shredder? The actual situation is closer to the latter.
The following data can help readers quickly learn Bitmain's money burning skills.
At the beginning of 2018, the entire cryptocurrency market has entered a bear market, but Bitmain's monthly operating costs have been rising wildly. Operating costs have risen from 10 million US dollars at the beginning of the year to 50 million US dollars at the end of the year.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
Operating costs are just the tip of the iceberg. Excessive chip trial production can become a classic case of project management courses. Readers who pay attention to Cryptocurrency mining can easily find that Bitmain is still working hard to clear the inventory of Antminer S9 in 2019. As the co-CEO, Ketuan Zhan did not listen to the advice or even warnings of the Finance Department, insisting on the implementation of Excessive chip trial production, resulting in a large accumulation of inventory and tight capital turnover. Another CEO, Jihan Wu, once revealed that the loss of Excessive chip trial production to the company was approximately US$1.5 billion.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
The BM1393 chip incident is even more incredible. Chip expert Ketuan Zhan invested a lot of money on a failed chip, and finally failed again. From 2017 to 2018, Bitmain has failed Trial production of mining machine chips at least 4 times, including 16nm, 12nm and 10nm chips, of which 16nm Trial production failed twice, thus losing at least US$1.2 billion.
It is rumored that Bitmain still holds a billion U.S. dollars worth of cryptocurrency in a state of floating loss. In view of the rebound in the market in 2020, we will not comment temporarily, waiting for the correct answer from the cryptocurrency market. But the losses pointed out in the previous article are all irreversible.
2. Sole power
In September 2018, Bitmain's management realized the seriousness of the problem. It turned out that the company's money could be squandered. As a result, the management began to discuss self-help plans, and the most reasonable and effective way was obviously to lay off employees.
The probation period for newly hired employees at Bitmain is half a year, and the probationary salary is 100% of the official salary, there is no difference. Once layoffs are made, new employees who have not passed the probationary period will be the main layoff targets. The department managed by Ketuan Zhan will face large-scale layoffs. The layoff plan is strongly opposed by Ketuan Zhan. Bitmain can only temporarily abandon the layoffs and replace it with continuous reductions. For marketing and travel expenses, a budget committee was established to strictly approve every expenditure. At the same time, employee benefits, such as reimbursement of taxi expenses, breakfast supply, snacks and drinks, etc., have also been abolished, and even the tradition of giving employees 400 yuan worth of BTC/BCH every month has been stopped.
In the face of huge cash flow pressure, trivial savings is obviously of no avail. Soon, the management again discussed the layoff plan, and it has reached the point where it has to be laid off.
In December 2018, Jihan Wu began to organize all entrepreneurial veterans and business backbones to persuade Ketuan Zhan to agree to layoffs, but Ketuan Zhan still insisted not to layoffs. The persuasion process was very unsuccessful. After many meetings and intense debates, Bitmain executives were caught in a dilemma of wasting time with Ketuan Zhan.
In this process, the shortcomings of the dual CEO system began to appear, and the relationship between the two CEOs gradually deteriorated.
On the night of December 16th, Ketuan Zhan reconvened the management meeting, and more than 30 managements who were present were asked to hand over their mobile phones. At this time, Jihan Wu was on a business trip in Hong Kong and was busy with listing related work.
In the meeting, Ketuan Zhan's core content was three items:
(1) Bitmain cannot have two CEOs, only one CEO and must be Ketuan Zhan. Ketuan Zhan said that he met an old leader during a business trip. He hadn't seen each other for many years. The old leader suggested that the company can only have one CEO, and it must be him. Ketuan Zhan feels that this is a kind of fate, an opportunity given by God.
(2) Ketuan Zhan believes that the company's cash flow problems, the biggest responsibility is the inability of the financial department. To prove his point, Ketuan Zhan announced Bitmain's financial data at the meeting. In the evening, employees in Taiwan began to post messages on social media, saying that the company's capital chain was broken and the top management was split.
(3) If Ketuan Zhan is not supported, the option will be cancelled and the equity will be voided.
Hearing about this, Jihan Wu, who lives in Hong Kong, sent a WeChat message to the management who are attending the meeting.

https://preview.redd.it/c5cxea2lqid51.jpg?width=1080&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3d6a0388408f6b8abe10648e5e4b7a3a5434c821
On the afternoon of December 17, 2018, Jihan Wu returned to Beijing to negotiate with Ketuan Zhan all night, and finally reached a consensus in the early morning. Bitmain co-founder Yuesheng Ge announced the results of the negotiations. Jihan Wu and Ketuan Zhan ceased to serve as CEOs, and Haichao Wang served as CEO. Jihan Wu voluntarily backed down and Ketuan Zhan served as chairman.
The "12.17 Incident" had a very bad impact on Bitmain, especially the disclosure of Bitmain's financial status, which caused vendors to start dunning. The loan that had just been negotiated with the Bank of Beijing was cancelled the next day. Jihan Wu's resignation as CEO caused an uproar in the industry, and it became a hot topic among Cryptocurrency mining, blockchain practitioners, and investor communities. The media focused their interpretation on Bitmain's series of incidents, and generally looked down upon its ongoing Hong Kong IPO, believing that the high-level changes had already signaled the failure of the IPO in advance.
On Christmas December 24, 2018, Bitmain finally began to implement the layoff plan. This long-delayed “correct decision” was achieved after a stalemate for nearly three months. The AI ​​teams in Beijing, Singapore, Taiwan, and Shanghai have laid off more than 50% of their employees. The Israeli R&D center was closed and Shenzhen New Species Technology Co., Ltd., which had been acquired for only ten months, was dissolved, and all employees were laid off. Copernicus, Bitmain's top blockchain development team, was not spared and was wiped out in this layoff. Copernicus and some of the laid-off employees joined the new company Matrixport co-founded by Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge, headquartered in Singapore.
3. Past events when starting a business
After the "12.17 Incident", Jihan Wu gradually faded out of Bitmain's management affairs and turned his attention to the IPO and new company. And this is one of Jihan Wu's major mistakes, he began to let Ketuan Zhan manage Bitmain alone.
In fact, as early as 2013, Jihan Wu planted hidden dangers.
Jihan Wu, an investment banker, was the earliest translator of the Bitcoin white paper. He began to get involved in the cryptocurrency mining industry in 2012. The disappearance of Kaomao and Nangua Zhang's ticket skipping led Jihan Wu to decide to develop his own chip.
In 2013, Jihan Wu established his own mining machine company. Together with Yuesheng Ge, who was only 20 years old, he found Ketuan Zhan, an integrated circuit designer of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to create the protagonist of this article, and later the digital Cryptocurrency mining giant, Bitmain.
Jihan Wu promised Ketuan Zhan that every time a mining machine chip was successfully developed, he would give some shares to the Ketuan Zhan team. At that time, the company founded by Ketuan Zhan was on the eve of falling apart. In order to regroup the team, Ketuan Zhan promised to share half of his shares with the team members. Unfortunately, this is just a bad check. With the rapid development of Bitmain and higher and higher valuations, the expanding Ketuan Zhan almost monopolized all the shares.
Like many startups, Bitmain encountered many difficulties in its early days, and many jobs had to be done by the boss. For example, in the chip design and production process in the second half of 2013, Bitmain was caught in a dilemma of insufficient funds. Jihan Wu personally raised funds and met with TSMC’s sales to persuade TSMC to accept the production needs of a start-up company. Jihan Wu also participated in the selection of the thermodynamic parameters of the heat sink in the Antminer S1.
In 2014, Jihan Wu discovered that this company was independently operated by Ketuan Zhan, which had huge problems. Forcing Jihan Wu to continue to participate in company management.
At that time, Bitmain's mining machine chips had just achieved a certain lead in the standard design process. Jihan Wu believes that the next step must be to develop full customization technology, but Ketuan Zhan plans to invest resources in the research of mobile payment chips.
Ketuan Zhan met a mysterious person from the Party Central Security Bureau who claimed to be able to manipulate the Party Central Committee’s decision-making process for the next generation of mobile payment cryptography standards, but this direction is likely to lead to the fact that Bitmain has just gained the lead in the mining machine market. Regained.
Jihan Wu said that as a graduate of the School of Economics, with a little memory of his high school stage and the knowledge reserve of a computer technology amateur, he retrieves various materials and papers every day, learns theories related to full customization, and goes to Ketuan Zhan conducts persuasion work there.
Fortunately, in the direction of full customization technology, Ketuan Zhan finally listened to Jihan Wu's opinion. Bitmain quickly integrated the technical experts from the United States and Russia introduced by Jihan Wu, which greatly improved the design level of chips and complete machines.
In 2015, Jihan Wu suggested that Ketuan Zhan consider the direction of artificial intelligence. But Ketuan Zhan is not here, he prefers the CPU direction. After staying asleep at night, coupled with in-depth analysis by the Bitmain investment team, Ketuan Zhan finally agreed with this direction. It is a pity that after the Tianshi Chen brothers made major breakthroughs in theory and practice, Bitmain officially invested in the relevant direction, and it was still a step behind.
In the two years from 2016 to 2017, Bitmain's business performance has achieved rapid development, becoming a unique super unicorn in the blockchain industry. According to Froth & Sullivan, in 2017, Bitmain Technology Holdings was the second largest fabless chip design company in China and the tenth largest fabless chip design company in the world, and the fourth largest fabless ASIC chip design company in the world, accounting for 74.5% of global cryptocurrency market share.
However, the huge crisis has long been buried in the early days of entrepreneurship.
Ketuan Zhan's decision on major directions revealed his weakness of extremely lack of business understanding. But every mistake he made was blocked by the company's core employees. His overconfidence in his management ability led to the gradual intensification of conflicts, and the management differences between the two founders became more serious.
4.The giant gets lost
The contradiction between the two broke out on December 17, 2018. Ketuan Zhan used extreme means to force the management to compromise with him by canceling the option, so as to achieve the goal of sole control of the company. Jihan Wu returned to Beijing from Hong Kong overnight and negotiated with Ketuan Zhan all night. In the end, the two resigned as CEO. Jihan Wu retired. Ketuan Zhan has the exclusive rights of chairman in exchange for the implementation of the layoff plan.
Jihan Wu's voluntary retreat has intensified Ketuan Zhan's management to do whatever he wants.
A Bitmain employee commented on Ketuan Zhan's management skills, summed up in two letters-SM.
After becoming the sole helm of the company, Ketuan Zhan quickly "rectified" the department in charge of Jihan Wu as the chairman of the board. He guided the sales of mining machines at the dinner, and pointed out that the sales performance is not due to the sales staff. Ability is strong, but the company provides opportunities. Take two sales leaders as examples, saying that if the company hadn't given the opportunity, they would still be losers. In addition, Ketuan Zhan also instructed the sales staff on how to toast and imparted the wine table culture and experience.
After the meal, Ketuan Zhan came to the conclusion that the quality of Bitmain sales staff was too poor, and Huawei’s blood needs to be injected to drive the company’s progress. Soon, the marketing and sales director from Huawei officially took over Bitmain, opening the era of brand premium for Antminer.
In order to further understand and guide the sales work, Ketuan Zhan asked to meet the customers with the sales staff. During the negotiation process, Ketuan Zhan had a heated discussion with customers on the issue of Chinese and Western medicine, and had also forced the sales staff to be able to ship 10,000 machines due to insufficient production capacity.
Although the requirements for sales personnel are strict, Ketuan Zhan has provided a lot of convenience for "Mainland Ark". In addition to selling mining machines at a more favorable price, Bitmain's mining machines are also hosted in Ming Wang at a higher price than the market price. Mine. It is reported that both Ketuan Zhan and Ming Wang are shareholders of Ark.
The new sales strategy of Huawei's executives has also brought very obvious changes to Bitmain. The self-righteous brand premium reduces the price-performance ratio of Antminer, causing competing products to eat away at Bitmain's market share. Later, Bitmain found that the strategy was wrong and started to cut prices, and found that the mining machine market was saturated and the purchase demand of miners had decreased.
More dangerous than the sales strategy is that the technical advantages of Antminer are being chased by competing products, and even overtaken. At the same time, the two mining pools under Bitmain also lost their first and second positions. The AI ​​business, which Jihan Wu placed high hopes and Ketuan Zhan personally supervised, became a laughing stock in the industry. Not only did it fail to make a profit, it almost brought down Bitmain.
Blindly introducing senior executives from Huawei to occupy important positions completely destroys the company's internal cultural foundation. The bureaucracy within Bitmain began to corrode from high-level employees to ordinary employees. Ketuan Zhan is not aware of this. He is still keen on recruiting Huawei employees, imitating Huawei's organizational structure and strategy, letting HR do sales and R&D personnel to do HR.
The organizational structure adjustment in October 2019 was the fuse for Ketuan Zhan to completely anger Bitmain management. This time, Ketuan Zhan completely marginalized Bitmain’s veteran employees, and suddenly promoted some of the “airborne soldiers” who had just joined the company to the position of person in charge, which caused the former person in charge to report to the new employees. The two managers who were originally equal The hierarchy becomes the subordinate relationship, the operation and development of different business lines are merged into a large department, the upward reporting process becomes more cumbersome, and the relationship between employees becomes delicate.
5. Headwind
On October 29, 2019, Jihan Wu urgently held a staff meeting. Prior to this, the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain has been changed to Jihan Wu, including the parent companies Hong Kong Bitmain and Cayman Bitmain. Jihan Wu stood in the lobby of Building 25, B1, announcing that Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Any employee in the Bitmain Group shall no longer execute Ketuan Zhan’s instructions and participate in any meetings convened by Ketuan Zhan. If there is any violation, the company will demotion and expel the company based on the severity of the circumstances. If losses are caused to the company, the company will be held accountable.
Jihan Wu's speech is very long, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Also expelled from the original Huawei company HR Zhi Wang introduced by Ketuan Zhan at the end of 2018. Zhi Wang’s reputation on Bitmain was extremely poor and was ridiculed by employees as "nine thousand years" (In ancient China, the emperor was called "ten thousand years old", and the prince was "eight thousand years old." However, in the Ming Dynasty, there was an eunuch who caused harm to the country and the people. He called himself "nine thousand years old", meaning that he was only A little lower than the emperor's level).
(2) Ketuan Zhan's ability to control the company's option incentive plan has disappeared, and it is no longer possible to cancel employees' options at will.
(3) The organizational structure adjustment plan led by Ketuan Zhan was suspended.
(4) We are optimistic about the future of AI business, but the premise is that the main business can continue to make profits in order to support the company's continued investment in AI business.
In the speech, Jihan Wu also told employees the whole story of the "12.17 Incident" and bluntly said that the company is not in good condition. If no measures are taken, Bitmain is likely to go bankrupt in three quarters and he must come back to save the company.
At this time, Ketuan Zhan, who was on a business trip in Shenzhen, finally experienced the situation of Jihan Wu in the "12.17 Incident".
After the official return, Jihan Wu began to clearly point out the company's various problems in operation and management, and went deep into each business line to understand the situation. In the mining machine sales department meeting, employees spoke enthusiastically, reflecting on the difficulties and opinions encountered in the work, the marketing and sales director from Huawei asked with a surprised look, "Why didn't these issues be reported to me before?", and soon , The director was interviewed and "voluntarily resigned."
On November 2, 2019, Jihan Wu announced a salary increase for all employees. Bitmain’s last salary increase dates back to 2018. In principle, Bitmain has two salary increases every year.
On November 7, 2019, Ketuan Zhan spoke on social media for the first time, describing his hardship in starting a business, and condemning Jihan Wu for “stabbing a knife in the back”. At the end of the article, he also set himself a KPI for 2020, that is, the mining machine market share will reach 90%, and the AI ​​business will earn 1 billion.
But Ketuan Zhan's majestic plan did not make Bitmain employees feel emotional, but ridiculed him instead. Employees exposed that he insulted employees, advocated Chinese medicine, believed in Buddhism, drank in meetings, practiced Qigong...
However, there is less than half a year before the halving of Bitcoin production, and the cryptocurrency market shows no signs of recovery, which makes Bitmain management very anxious.
On January 6, 2020, Bitmain ushered in another round of layoffs, with a layoff ratio of about 1/3. This time the layoffs have caused many employees who have just increased their salaries to feel very grieved. On the one hand, they were looking forward to Jihan Wu's return. On the other hand, the compensation for this layoff was less than 18 years.
Ketuan Zhan, who has been unable to enter the Bitmain office area, once again spoke on social media and firmly opposed to layoffs. We do not need to lay off staff and we cannot commit suicide.
During the Spring Festival, Covid-19 broke out. Mainland China has begun to extend the Spring Festival holiday and advocate working from home. Under the chain reaction caused by Covid-19, most companies have chosen to cut salaries or even lay off employees. In the first two months of 2020, China's exports fell by 17%, U.S. stocks were broken four times in a row, Bitcoin plunged 40% in 24 hours on March 12, 2020, and crude oil futures fell by 300% on April 20, 2020...
Obviously, Jihan Wu can't predict, but this layoff seems to be the right decision again. In addition, from January to April 2020, Bitmain's revenue exceeded US$400 million amid the spread of Covid-19 and the collapse of the financial market.
6. Fight to the death
When Jihan Wu tried to get the company back on track, Ketuan Zhan was not helpless. On April 28, 2020, Ketuan Zhan finally rolled back the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain to before October 28, 2019 by repeatedly submitting administrative reconsiderations, and restored his status as a legal representative.
On the morning of May 8, 2020, a piece of news about Bitmain quickly appeared on the real-time hot search rankings, and even dominated the headlines of the day. At window 52 on the second floor of the Haidian District Government Affairs Center, when Ketuan Zhan, the legal person of Beijing Bitmain Company, was receiving the business license, a group of unidentified people snatched the business license from the industrial and commercial administrative staff. A source at the scene said that the number of unidentified people in the group was about 60 people, of which Luyao Liu was directing at the scene.
This is a skillful piece of news. It first leads readers to think that Ketuan Zhan is a victim, using 60 people to grab business licenses as the focus. The masses accused Jihan Wu of lawlessness, but ignored whether the government affairs center could have 60 personnel. As for Hong Kong Bitmain to have the right to appoint a representative to obtain a business license, this is a deeper level of thinking.
The follow-up report restored the real situation at the scene. Only more than ten people were present, and both sides were equipped with security personnel. Bitmain employees also broke the news in the circle of friends, claiming that Ketuan Zhan's bodyguard had injured Bitmain's authorized person, and said in a threatening tone, "Be careful!"
However, the subsequent plot reversal did not have much effect. Jihan Wu's reputation has been greatly affected. From a bloody soldier who rescued the company in trouble to a lawless criminal, it can be said to be a world of war. do not.
Ketuan Zhan, who succeeded in the first battle, began to counterattack Bitmain continuously. On the afternoon of June 3, 2020, Ketuan Zhan led a team to pry open the back door of the Beijing Bitmain office and formally occupied the deserted Beijing headquarters.
On June 4, 2020, Ketuan Zhan called on Bitmain employees to resume work and promised to expand the company's market value to more than US$50 billion within three to five years. After that, Ketuan Zhan began to contact employees by phone, trying to acquire the options in the hands of employees at a valuation of 4 billion US dollars.
Subsequently, Ketuan Zhan recalled Huawei's executives and issued a series of personnel appointments and removals. As of June 9, 2020, Ketuan Zhan has successively eliminated CFO Luyao Liu, and Wenguang Wang, the head of the mining center. Luyao Liu is responsible for controlling Bitmain's IPO plan. He also appointed Yanwu Ma as the HR director, Gang Ren as the head of the mining center, Yonggang Sun as the head of the supply chain, Ling Gu as the financial director, and Bin Zhu as the head of the mining machine business department. Bin Zhu is the senior executive of Huawei who was interviewed and left as mentioned in the previous article. During his tenure, he reduced Antminer’s 90% market share to 50%, and received a large number of complaints from miners. Internal employees once speculated that he might be Compete against the spies sent by the company.
In addition to recalling senior executives of Huawei, Ketuan Zhan also urged employees to return to work. They can receive a bonus of 10,000 yuan when they return to work on the same day, which is only half the next day. Ketuan Zhan showed a very kind side. Every time the elevator door is opened, Ketuan Zhan's hot gaze can be met, shaking hands, taking photos, and receiving money. As there is no personnel information, Ketuan Zhan does not know whether the person receiving the money is a Bitmain employee, and these people did not resume work the next day.
The effect of gentleness was not good, Ketuan Zhan began to force employees to return to work. Seeing that there are still very few respondents, Ketuan Zhan threatened employees through SMS, phone calls, EMS, emails and other harassment, issued multiple threats such as termination of contract, suspension of payment of social insurance, suspension of wages, and even used personal information saved by employees to form a group of employees. Domicile threats, requiring employees to perform "work handover", trying to force employees to return work computers, etc.
On June 10, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan had controlled Bitmain's Shenzhen factory and prohibited employees from delivering normal shipments to paid customers, which caused difficulties in the operation of the Bitmain mining machine department.
On June 13, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain, the parent company of Beijing Bitmain, issued a statement accusing Ketuan Zhan of signing a "Sales Agency Agreement" with the Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd. in which it holds shares, in an attempt to embezzle Beijing Bit's assets.
On June 17, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan started selling 14,000 T17+ series mining machines at low prices.
On June 20, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain officially suspended the supply of chips to the Shenzhen factory.
On July 13, 2020, in the "A Letter to All My colleagues in the Shenzhen Factory" released by Bitmain in Hong Kong, more details were added on the series of Ketuan Zhan's actions in June.
The legal person Feng Zhou of the Shenzhen plant is related to Ketuan Zhan. After being relieved of Ketuan Zhan's post, Jihan Wu flew to Shenzhen to have a long talk with Feng Zhou. Jihan Wu believes that Feng Zhou is the right person to manage the factory and help the company overcome difficulties, and decides to leave Feng Zhou to continue to manage the factory.
This wrong decision staged a story of a farmer and a snake. When Ketuan Zhan began to counterattack Bitmain, Feng Zhou was also quickly instigated and began to assist Ketuan Zhan in seizing customer machines and transferring 17,000 T17 mining machines in the warehouse. Hainan Continental Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd., which is held by Ketuan Zhan, sold them at a low price.
In order to protect the interests of customers, Jihan Wu had to make a compromise and paid the payment for some goods to a bank account controlled by Ketuan Zhan in exchange for delivery. However, after the other party received a payment of 109 million, the delivery stopped. On July 8, 2020, 5600 mining machines have been overdue.
At the same time, the factory defaulted on suppliers’ accounts payable as much as 200 million yuan. Bank acceptance bills issued by the factory, exceeding 36 million yuan, will expire on July 17, and more than 34 million yuan will expire on July 23. It is understood that Ketuan Zhan, after receiving the bank's dunning call, made it clear that he would not repay the loan, which would destroy the company and the entire group's credit in financial institutions.
7、 This is not the end
So far, the power struggle between the founders of Bitmain has been more than half a year. The office building already occupied by Ketuan Zhan is still empty, and most employees choose to work from home. Some chip developers returned to the office with the acquiescence of Jihan Wu and continued to maintain research and development to reduce the impact of infighting on technological iteration and competitiveness.
This giant ship that once stood on top of the supercomputer chip is crashing into the iceberg due to the madness of the former helm. Ketuan Zhan's madness and Jihan Wu's compromise made mistakes again and again. Bitmain tried to save himself many times, but was unable to get out of the black hole.
If the time goes back to that day in 2013, would Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge still choose to dial Ketuan Zhan?
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HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TO RUN A 1 CARD MINING RIG? How Much Is 1 Bitcoin Worth? What Is One BTC Worth? - YouTube $7000 ASIC Miner Mined $1000 Dollars in Bitcoin in a Month ... Bitcoin Mining 2019 - Should We Mine Bitcoin? - YouTube Bitcoin Miner 2020 no fee

The Ethereum mining profitability results and mining rewards were calculated using the best ETH mining calculator with the following inputs. A ETH mining difficulty of 3,184,411,952,303,777.00, a ETH mining hashrate of 500.00 MH/s consuming 950 watts of power at $0.10 per kWh, and a block reward of 2.00 ETH at $351.57 (ETH to USD). New York-based research firm Fundstart said the price of bitcoin is nearing a break-even of 1.0x, meaning the reward for mining a bitcoin equals the total cost. “Bitcoin currently trades ... Find out what your expected return is depending on your hash rate and electricity cost. Find out if it's profitable to mine Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, DASH or Monero. Do you think you've got what it takes to join the tough world of cryptocurrency mining? The scarcity of this coin caused the research firm Fundstrat to recently predict that the price of Bitcoin is nearing a break-even of 1.0x, meaning the reward for mining a Bitcoin equals the total cost. Cloud mining. Miners turn to cloud mining to slash hardware and energy costs by leasing mining hardware or hashing power from a remote datacenter. Start Mining Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, including Dash, Litecoin, Zcash, Ethereum. Check out our pricing plans today! ... 1 Bitcoin equals $ 10595.92. 1 Dash equals $ 64.9. 1 Ethereum equals $ 340.1. 1 Litecoin equals $ 45.83. 1 Monero equals $ 105.57. 1 Zcash equals $ 61.22. 1 Ripple equals $ 0.244329. 1 SiaCoin $ 0.0026522.

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HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TO RUN A 1 CARD MINING RIG?

What it really takes to mine a Bitcoin in 10 Minutes. Firstly I'll show you a special free method to mine Bitcoin and send funds directly to your wallet in 1... Using a Kill A Watt to see how much it cost to run one gtx 1060ssc 6gb. As you mine on zcash on nanopool. Follow mOE at: ☻http://www.twitch.tv/m0e_tv ☻https://www.facebook.com/m0etv ☻https://twitter.com/m0E_tv ☻https://instagram.com/m0e_tv Intro By PubFX http... Latest Video: http://bit.ly/BW10000 1. Buy Bitcoins: http://bit.ly/BWCoinbase 2. Best Crypto Exchange: http://bit.ly/BWBinance 3. ROBINHOOD http://bit.ly/ROB... #best bitcoin mining app 2020 #bitcoin mining android 2020 #telegram bitcoin mining bot 2020 #best bitcoin miner 2020 #best bitcoin miner hardware 2020 #bitcoin mining cost 2020 #bitcoin mining ...

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